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ARTICLES 
Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking 
Michael Abramowicz† & Thomas B. Colby†† 
Executive branch agencies typically use a process of “notice and comment” to 
permit the public to respond to the proposed text of rules. The legal literature has not 
considered whether a similar process would be helpful for the judicial branch. This 
Article argues that it would be. Neither the parties to a litigation nor third parties gener-
ally have an opportunity to comment on judicial opinions after they are drafted but 
before they are made final. As a result, judicial opinions often contain errors and fre-
quently have far-ranging and unanticipated negative consequences. A notice-and-
comment system could mitigate these concerns, and could also help to constrain judges 
to follow the rule of law and to improve the legitimacy of the judicial process.  
INTRODUCTION 
Last term, the Supreme Court made a high-profile and embarrass-
ing error in the course of holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause precludes a state from imposing the 
death penalty for the crime of raping a child.
1
 The Court based its hold-
ing on “evidence of a national consensus” that such a punishment is 
excessive,
2
 and noted that, “[a]s for federal law, Congress in the Federal 
Death Penalty Act of 1994 expanded the number of federal crimes for 
which the death penalty is a permissible sentence, including certain 
 † Professor, The George Washington University Law School. 
 †† Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School.  
In the spirit of its subject matter, this Article was made available for public comment, and we 
incorporated excellent suggestions from Steve Charnovitz, David Fontana, Fred Lawrence, Ro-
nald Levin, Eric Lipman, Chip Lupu, and Richard Pierce. 
1 See Kennedy v Louisiana, 128 S Ct 2641, 2664–65 (2008). 
 2 See id at 2653. The Eighth Amendment, the Court stated, “draw[s] its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id at 2649, quoting 
Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 101 (1958) (plurality).  
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nonhomicide offenses; but it did not do the same for child rape or 
abuse.”
3
 A few days after the Court issued its opinion, a blogger pointed 
out that, contrary to the Court’s implication that there is no provision 
for the death penalty for child rape in federal law, Congress revised the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice in 2006 to add child rape to the list of 
crimes that can trigger the death penalty under military law.
4
 That blog 
post triggered substantial news coverage criticizing the Court for its 
glaring omission,
5
 and it prompted law professor bloggers to ponder 
whether the Court could have avoided the mistake if it had taken advan-
tage of “current social technologies”
6
 to harness “the wisdom of crowds.”
7
 
  
 3 Kennedy, 128 S Ct at 2652.  
 4 See Dwight Sullivan, Supremes Dis the Military Justice System, CAAFlog (June 28, 2008), 
online at http://caaflog.blogspot.com/2008/06/supremes-dis-military-justice-system.html (visited 
Sept 1, 2009).  
 5 The New York Times picked up the story the following week and explained that the 
parties had been entirely unaware of the new military law and had failed to call it to the atten-
tion of the Justices. See Linda Greenhouse, In Court Ruling on Executions, a Factual Flaw, NY 
Times A1 (July 2, 2008). Commentators, including some with misgivings about the death penalty, 
were critical of the Court. See, for example, Lawrence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court Is Wrong on 
the Death Penalty, Wall St J A13 (July 31, 2008). 
 6 Professor Tom Smith observed: 
It appears the law finding mechanism we use to inform the Court about what the law is [is] 
laughably inefficient in the era of the Web and the blogosphere. The Court is supposed to 
be, among other things, the really deep, really well informed body on our federal law, right? 
Yet they missed something a blogger came up with off the top of his head.  
  . . .  
Is there a way that the Court could take advantage of current social technologies to dra-
matically improve its understanding of the relevant law in any given case? Of course there 
is, but I’m not holding my breath. You could, for example, post all of the briefs in wiki for-
mat, or something similar, and then sift through the results. But any procedure you could 
come up with could be gamed, and it seems unlikely the federal judiciary could ever bring 
itself to modify its procedures to really take advantage of Web 2.0 sorts of tech.  
Tom Smith, Jurisprudence and Information, The Right Coast Blog (July 7, 2008), online at 
http://rightcoast.typepad.com/rightcoast/2008/07/jurisprudence-a.html (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
 7 Paul Cassell, Should the Supreme Court Take Advantage of the Web?, The Volokh Con-
spiracy Blog (July 9, 2008), online at http://volokh.com/posts/1215574584.shtml (visited Sept 1, 
2009) (noting that, when he was a federal district judge, he sought to harness the “wisdom of 
crowds” by “circulat[ing] ‘tentative’ written rulings to the parties before holding oral argument,” 
and suggesting that the Supreme Court might consider doing the same). The “wisdom of crowds” is 
an allusion to James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few 
and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations (Doubleday 2004). 
These ideas are not entirely new. Another blogger made a similar suggestion a few years earlier. See 
Jason Mazzone, SupremeCourtOfTheUnitedStates.blogspot.com?, Concurring Opinions Blog (Dec 
17, 2005), online at http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/12/supremecourtoft.html 
(visited Sept 1, 2009):  
The Supreme Court should operate a blog to generate input on the Court’s opinions before 
they are published. The postings could range from limited issues (“if we decide in the peti-
tioner’s favor, is it better to remand to the lower courts?”) to entire drafts of opinions and 
requests for comments.  
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This was hardly the first, or even likely the most consequential, 
error that the Court has made that could have been caught by public 
input.
8
 It is thus not surprising with the rise of the Internet, and partic-
ularly “Web 2.0”
9
 technologies incorporating user input, that legal 
commentators would at least fleetingly consider the possibility of inte-
grating such technologies into the practice of judicial opinion writing. 
These possibilities, however, have received no sustained scholarly atten-
tion, perhaps because the idea of the United States Reports being re-
placed by something like the United States Wiki is simply beyond the 
pale. Still, putting that sort of hyperbole to the side, an intriguing core 
idea remains: courts could make draft opinions available to the public 
for comment before issuing them in final form. This Article proposes 
that the courts do just that. 
Although it would represent a significant change to judicial cul-
ture, this proposal is not as wacky as it might first sound. Indeed, a 
variant on this system, in which draft opinions are distributed to the 
parties prior to oral argument, is already practiced in some California 
and Arizona courts.
10
 This approach is a start, but inadequate. It allows 
input only from the parties, and it may not always be feasible for liti-
gants to offer a sufficiently developed critique of a tentative opinion 
  
And in his famous administrative law treatise, Kenneth Culp Davis once suggested, without 
elaboration, that notice and comment be used for both administrative and nonadministrative 
adjudication. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14.6 at 29–30 (K.C. Davis 
2d ed 1980) (suggesting that the procedure be used only where new law is being created). 
 8 For example, in one apportionment case, despite having received briefing focusing on a 
technical issue, the Court apparently still made a critical technical error on the central issue in 
the case—an error that could have been clarified by the parties and the public had they been 
given the opportunity. See Paul H. Edelman, Getting the Math Right: Why California Has Too 
Many Seats in the House of Representatives, 59 Vand L Rev 297, 317–18 (2006) (discussing United 
States Department of Commerce v Montana, 503 US 442 (1992), in which the Court, because it 
misunderstood an affidavit submitted by a government expert, used a nonsensical denominator in 
calculating the proper apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives among the states). 
 9 This phrase refers to technologies such as social networking, blogs with comments, and 
the like, that allow individual users to contribute to the authorship of websites. See Lisa Veas-
man, Note, “Piggy Backing” on the Web 2.0 Internet: Copyright Liability and Web 2.0 Mashups, 30 
Hastings Commun & Enter L J 311, 314–15 (2008). 
 10 See Thomas E. Hollenhorst, Tentative Opinions: An Analysis of Their Benefit in the Ap-
pellate Court of California, 36 Santa Clara L Rev 1, 14–16 (1995) (chronicling the development of 
the Tentative Opinion Program); Mark Hummels, Distributing Draft Decisions before Oral Ar-
gument on Appeal: Should the Court Tip Its Tentative Hand? The Case for Dissemination, 46 Ariz 
L Rev 317, 340–41 (2004) (arguing that providing a draft of the court’s tentative ruling narrows 
the focus of parties and improves the quality of oral argument and judicial decisions). Outside of 
these courts, a handful of individual judges have adopted this practice on their own. See Richard 
C. Braman, Prehearing Tentative Rulings Promote Intellectual Integrity in Judicial Opinions and 
Respect for the System, 49 APR Fed L 50, 50 (2002). 
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in response to questions at oral argument, or for judges to appreciate 
nuances in these verbal responses.
11
  
Under our proposal, the general public would be invited to com-
ment, and responses would be submitted in writing. The practice 
would thus be similar to one routinely employed by another branch of 
government: notice-and-comment rulemaking by administrative agen-
cies.
12
 The fact that a similar practice has been in longstanding use in 
administrative law highlights three points. First, employing public 
comment to guide governmental decisionmaking is not revolutionary.
13
 
Second, the possibility of allowing public input into governmental de-
cisions does not depend on the existence of the Internet; indeed, while 
the Internet may efficiently reduce costs of public participation, we 
are skeptical that opening government to those who cannot be bo-
thered to stick a first-class stamp will meaningfully improve public 
contribution. Third, the administrative experience shows that the use-
fulness of public participation goes well beyond the correction of the 
occasional objective error. 
In this Article, we argue that the case for notice-and-comment 
judicial decisionmaking is in most respects at least as strong as the 
case for notice-and-comment administrative rulemaking. In adminis-
trative law, the notice-and-comment process serves several related 
functions: providing information to decisionmakers, legitimating the 
  
 11 See notes 215–18 and accompanying text. At the international level, tribunals do some-
times give parties a chance to comment on a pending opinion after oral argument. See, for ex-
ample, World Trade Organization, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes, Art 15 ¶ 1, 33 ILM 112, 122 (1994) (“Following the consideration of rebuttal 
submissions and oral arguments, the panel shall issue the descriptive (factual and argument) 
sections of its draft report to the parties to the dispute. Within a period of time set by the panel, 
the parties shall submit their comments in writing.”); North American Free Trade Agreement 
(1993), annex § 1903.2 ¶ 4, 32 ILM 605, 608 (“Within 14 days of the issuance of the initial declara-
tory opinion, a Party to the dispute disagreeing in whole or in part with the opinion may present 
a written statement of its objections and the reasons for those objections to the panel.”). Al-
though this approach still falls short of what we have in mind, its existence does help to establish 
the plausibility of our proposal. 
 12 See 5 USC § 553. 
 13 Public comment also plays a role, albeit an informal one, in legislative decisionmaking. 
The text of bills pending in Congress is available to the public in searchable form on the Library 
of Congress’s THOMAS website. See THOMAS, The Library of Congress, online at 
http://thomas.loc.gov (visited Sept 1, 2009). And, of course, members of the public have an oppor-
tunity to contact their representatives in Congress to express support for, or concerns about, 
pending legislation. See, for example, Write Your Representative, United States House of Repre-
sentatives, online at https://writerep.house.gov/writerep/welcome.shtml (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
President Barack Obama has institutionalized a more formalized role for public comment in the 
presentment process. He has committed to making the text of bills sent to him for his signature 
available to the public for comment before he signs or vetoes them. See Ethics, Barack Obama, 
online at http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/index_campaign.php (visited Sept 1, 2009) 
(“As president, Obama will not sign any non-emergency bill without giving the American public 
an opportunity to review and comment on the White House website for five days.”).  
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decisionmaking process, and constraining decisionmakers by pushing 
them to confront arguments that point away from their preferred 
course of action. All of those functions could be served equally as well, 
if not better, in the judicial context. Generalist courts consisting of 
only a small number of judges may benefit from public provision of 
information even more than specialized agencies with many available 
contributing experts, especially when decisions touch on highly technic-
al matters. Public participation through notice and comment would also 
help the courts overcome those objections to their legitimacy stemming 
from the fact that judges establish broad rules governing all of society 
in the process of resolving concrete (and often idiosyncratic) cases 
between individual parties. Finally, because the potential for political 
or ideological decisionmaking threatens judicial decisions as much as 
administrative ones, the need for constraint is just as critical in the 
judicial arena. And there is reason to believe that the constraining 
potential of notice and comment is as great or greater in the judicial 
context as in the administrative one. 
In short, judges, like administrative officials, make generally ap-
plicable rules of law.
14
 Whether there is something illicit about the way 
in which—or the extent to which—they do so is, of course, a subject of 
much disagreement,
15
 on which we offer no opinion here. Our point is 
simply that, for better or for worse, judges make law, and so the usual 
arguments for (and against) notice-and-comment rulemaking apply. 
Yet notice and comment may be even more useful for judicial deci-
sionmaking because legal reasoning follows interpretive conventions 
alien to raw policy analysis. This increases the danger that judges will 
resort to instinctive policy assessments when interpretation initially 
appears inconclusive (an information problem), that judges will make 
broad policy decisions under the guise of pseudo-interpretation (a 
legitimacy problem),
16
 and that judges will make policy decisions that 
deviate from the outcomes permitted by the norms of legal interpreta-
tion (a constraint problem).   
To be sure, the administrative notice-and-comment process is not 
without its critics,
17
 who might well worry that its importation into the 
judicial context would make litigation too cumbersome. It is, for in-
stance, easy to imagine the courts being inundated by largely worth-
less comments in high-profile, politically charged cases. Sufficiently 
  
 14 See Part I.B.  
 15 See, for example, Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 NYU L Rev 1, 2 (1990) (inquir-
ing whether lawmaking is a natural byproduct of dispute resolution, and, if it is not, whether the 
lawmaking role played by the courts of this country is legitimate and justified). 
 16 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr, Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpre-
tations of Statutory Provisions, 41 Vand L Rev 301, 308 (1988).  
 17 See notes 309–11 and accompanying text.  
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voluminous comments could impair both the informational and con-
straint functions of notice-and-comment decisionmaking, while greatly 
increasing the cost of responses. An effective mechanism for filtering 
out low-value comments would thus greatly increase the benefits of 
notice and comment. We argue that simplistic Web 2.0 approaches are 
unlikely to be effective, and more radical mechanisms are less likely to 
be adopted. Nonetheless, a low-tech approach—allowing parties and 
third parties to submit a primary set of comments strictly limited in 
length and requiring their attorneys to certify under threat of sanction 
that their comments are not redundant of others already submitted—
would help identify concisely the most significant deficiencies of opinions.  
Similarly, judicial importation of “hard look review,”
18
 the doc-
trine enforcing agencies’ responsibility to respond meaningfully to 
significant comments, would likely have costs swamping any corres-
ponding benefits. Thus, we do not seek to impose an affirmative, en-
forceable obligation on judges to respond to comments, and we are 
not proposing that the failure to respond adequately to valuable 
comments should itself be reversible error. Rather, because reputation 
may be a more powerful motivator of judges than of administrative 
agency officials, notice and comment might provide genuine constraint 
benefits even without an enforcement mechanism. Alternatively, eval-
uation of judges’ responsiveness to comments could be integrated into 
a broader program of judicial performance evaluation.
19
 For example, 
after becoming final, a small percentage of opinions could be syste-
matically reviewed by an independent panel of experts to determine if 
they fairly addressed strong arguments raised in the comments. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to judge in a rigorous way whether the 
benefits of judicial notice and comment would be sufficient to justify 
the costs incurred by litigants, third parties, and judges. We believe 
that, on the whole, the increases in information, legitimacy, and con-
straint generally would be worth the costs. Our proposal would ad-
dress an unmet need in our legal system, giving the parties and the 
public an opportunity to criticize the reasoning, and indeed the exact 
words, chosen by the court, and giving judges an opportunity to 
change their minds or refine their analysis once they are presented 
with particularized critiques of their tentative reasoning. Both the 
identification of weaknesses in a tentative opinion and the earlier an-
ticipation that weaknesses would be highlighted will encourage judges 
to confront, and in some cases to accept, significant counterarguments.  
  
 18 See notes 290–92 and accompanying text.  
 19 See Rebecca Love Kourlis and Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation Program 
for the Federal Judiciary, 86 Denver U L Rev 7, 8–9 (2008).  
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Our argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, we argue that the 
current practice of issuing opinions that are effectively final upon re-
lease has serious drawbacks in terms of the provision of relevant in-
formation to the courts, the legitimacy of the judiciary, and judicial con-
straint. Part II explains why existing mechanisms, such as rehearings and 
amicus briefs, only partially alleviate these concerns. It then argues that 
notice and comment could provide more information while increasing 
the legitimacy of the judicial process and helping to constrain judicial 
decisionmakers. Part III considers obstacles and objections, assessing the 
costs to the public and courts of making and considering comments, and 
elaborating on the differences between notice and comment in the ad-
ministrative and judicial contexts that would make the latter less cumber-
some. We conclude by addressing the concern that notice-and-comment 
deliberations might be seen to undermine judicial dignity. 
I.  CAUSES FOR CONCERN 
The judicial practice of deciding cases after receiving written 
briefs and sometimes hearing oral argument means that participation 
by the parties (and sometimes the public) takes place in anticipation 
of possible decisional approaches rather than in response to a particu-
lar approach tentatively chosen by a court. This presents concerns for 
both third parties and litigants. Judicial opinions often effectively bind 
third parties who may not even have known of the existence of the 
case, let alone anticipated the exact contours of the ruling, before the 
opinion was issued. The parties to a litigation have greater participa-
tion opportunities, but are sometimes blindsided by unforeseen errors 
or misunderstandings in the court’s opinion to which they had no ef-
fective opportunity to respond.  
A. Current Parties 
In drafting their briefs, the parties do their best to predict which 
issues, arguments, and facts the court will consider to be important. 
But often, when it drafts its opinion, the court goes off on its own, ad-
dressing matters not briefed by the parties. Sometimes the court will 
decide the case on the basis of “facts” in the record not addressed by 
the parties
20
—which means that the court’s decision is driven by evi-
  
 20 See, for example, Elliott v City of Clarksville, 2007 WL 470467, *22 (MD Tenn) (“[T]he 
Court still retains discretion to consider all facts presented by the parties, as well as any other 
facts apparent in the record that were not even addressed by the parties.”); Matter of Estate of 
Wagler, 577 NE2d 878, 879 (Ill Ct App 1991) (“We hasten to point out, however, that this court 
may look to the record to discern facts not cited by the parties.”). See also Thomas B. Marvell, 
Appellate Courts and Lawyers: Information Gathering in the Adversary System 170–71 (Green-
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dence that the parties never explained and the meaning or importance 
of which they never contested. If the court misconstrues this evidence, 
it can wrongly decide the case without hearing from the parties as to 
why its understanding is inaccurate. Other times, the court will resolve 
the case by employing legal reasoning and citing legal authorities not 
suggested by the parties
21
—which means that the parties were never 
able to challenge or criticize the legal reasoning that drove the court’s 
decision. Appellate courts in particular often rely on numerous hours 
of research by law clerks, staff attorneys, and judges to ascertain the 
governing legal authorities.
22
 This can lead to mistakes that the parties 
might have caught if given a chance.
23
  
Sometimes, a court will even decide a case on the basis of an en-
tire legal issue never raised or addressed by the parties
24
—which 
means that the court ends up resolving the dispute and making law 
without any input at all on how to craft the proper rule. This pheno-
menon can be seen in the application of specific rules of appellate law, 
such as the rule that appellate courts can affirm a judgment for any 
reason, even one that was not briefed to the appellate court or argued 
in the lower court,
25
 and in the rule that federal courts have a duty to 
raise questions of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when 
  
wood 1978) (noting that appellate judges and their clerks often read the record and rely on facts 
not cited by the parties in deciding appeals). 
 21 Indeed, one study of 112 cases decided by a state supreme court in a single year found 
that approximately one half of all legal authorities cited by the court were not mentioned by 
counsel in their briefs or arguments. Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 6, 133–36 (cited in 
note 20). In 25 percent of those cases, none of the legal authority relied upon by the court was 
cited by counsel. Id at 133. A similar study of thirty Sixth Circuit cases found that only 55 percent 
of the authorities cited, and only 65 percent of those emphasized, by the court had been included 
in the briefs. Id at 134–35. 
 22 See id at 135. Many law clerks use “the briefs hardly at all or only as a place to begin the 
research when writing draft opinions or memorandums. The law clerks or, increasingly, the staff 
attorneys do the great bulk of the research.” Id. 
 23 Adam A. Milani and Michael R. Smith give a striking example in discussing Poyner v 
Loftus, 694 A2d 69 (DC 1997). See Adam A. Milani and Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Criti-
cal Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn L Rev 245, 259–61 (2002). The 
case of Poyner involved a legally blind man who brought suit after he was injured when he fell 
from an elevated walkway. See 694 A2d at 69. The DC Court of Appeals based its affirmance of 
summary judgment for the defendants on authorities not cited by the parties: cases from other 
jurisdictions articulating a common law rule that a blind person is contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law if he walks without a cane or guide dog. See id at 72–73. What the court did not 
realize, however, was that that old common law rule had been abrogated by statute in a number 
of jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia. Milani and Smith, 69 Tenn L Rev at 260–61.  
 24 See, for example, US S Ct Rule 24(1)(a) (“At its option, . . . the Court may consider a 
plain error not among the questions presented but evident from the record and otherwise within 
its jurisdiction to decide.”). 
 25 See, for example, Tahara v Matson Terminals, Inc, 511 F3d 950, 955 (9th Cir 2007) 
(“Though the parties have not discussed § 928(c), we may affirm the district court for any reason 
supported by the record.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
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the parties have not addressed them.
26
 But its application is sometimes 
much broader.
27
 Among the many Supreme Court cases that decided 
fundamental issues without the benefit of briefing from the parties on 
those issues
28
 are such landmark decisions as Erie Railroad Co v 
Tompkins,
29
 Mapp v Ohio,
30
 Washington v Davis,
31
 and Employment 
Division v Smith.
32
 And the Supreme Court is not alone in this prac-
tice; other courts frequently engage in similar behavior.
33
 As a result, 
parties often lose cases on issues that they never briefed, denying them 
the opportunity to make persuasive arguments to the court, and in turn 
potentially undermining the quality of the decision rendered. As Judge 
Frank Easterbrook has written, “Resolving a case on a ground not pre-
sented . . . increases the risk that an uninformed opinion will impede 
rather than promote commerce. It is hard enough to navigate when the 
court sticks to questions fully ventilated by counsel.”
34
  
Also of concern to the parties is that a court might reach a deci-
sion without fully considering arguments that litigants in fact have 
made.
35
 A decisionmaker might shirk the duty to analyze all relevant 
arguments, particularly in cases that receive little public attention. The 
judicial utility function does, after all, include leisure.
36
 It takes less 
  
 26 See, for example, Andrus v Charlestone Stone Products Co, Inc, 436 US 604, 607 n 6 
(1978) (“Although the question of the District Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction was not raised 
in this Court or apparently in either court below, we have an obligation to consider the question 
sua sponte.”).  
 27 Although courts often find an issue not raised by a party to be waived, see, for example, 
Marks v Newcourt Credit Group, Inc, 342 F3d 444, 462 (6th Cir 2003) (holding that, according to 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant waives an issue by failing to present it in 
his initial briefs), they can offer new arguments on behalf of issues already raised, see, for example, 
Eldred v Reno, 239 F3d 372, 383–84 (DC Cir 2001) (noting that a court can reach beyond the parties’ 
arguments with respect to issues before the court), and the definition of “issue” is sufficiently nebulous 
that courts often have considerable freedom to reach beyond what the parties contemplated. 
 28 See Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an 
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 San Diego L Rev 1253, 1255–56 (2002); Milani and Smith, 69 Tenn L 
Rev at 245, 253–59, 311 (cited in note 23). 
 29 304 US 64 (1938) (abolishing general federal common law). 
 30 367 US 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule against the states). 
 31 426 US 229 (1976) (rejecting disparate impact liability under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 32 494 US 872 (1990) (rejecting disparate impact liability under the Establishment Clause). 
 33 See Milani and Smith, 69 Tenn L Rev at 248 (cited in note 23) (noting that “raising issues 
sua sponte is not an uncommon practice”). Thomas Marvell’s study of state supreme court deci-
sions found that 16 of the 112 opinions studied resolved issues not raised by the parties. See 
Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 122 (cited in note 20). 
 34 Frank H. Easterbrook, Afterword: On Being a Commercial Court, 65 Chi Kent L Rev 
877, 880 (1989). 
 35 See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the 
Duty to Decide, 94 Georgetown L J 121, 132 (2005). 
 36 Judge Posner reminds us of this in his writing, though not by example. See Richard A. 
Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S Ct Econ Rev 1, 
10–11 (1993) (suggesting that judges, since they are in a nonprofit sector, favor increased leisure 
over increased compensation). 
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time and effort to resolve a case after casually reviewing a few argu-
ments than after carefully reviewing more of them. The failure to ade-
quately consider relevant arguments can also stem from overconfi-
dence. The cognitive psychology literature teaches that decisionmakers 
and other assessors of evidence will tend to assimilate information in 
ways that accord with their prior views, thus avoiding cognitive disson-
ance.
37
 This is the bias of cognitive consistency: judges confronted with 
arguments against their pre-held or instinctive positions may dismiss 
these arguments too easily. And once the judges issue their opinions, it 
is too late for the parties to explain to the judges how they have failed 
to grapple adequately with important arguments.  
B. Third Parties 
However significant the foregoing concerns may be, they 
represent only the tip of the iceberg. The deficiencies in our current 
legal process have negative effects that extend well beyond the parties 
to the litigation—to third parties and society as a whole. 
There was a time when judicial opinions were of little import. The 
conventional wisdom was that common law judges are bound not by 
the opinions issued in prior cases, but rather only by the outcome of 
those cases—the resolution of the dispute on the facts presented.
38
 Be-
cause it was “the decision itself which must be followed and not the opi-
nion,”
39
 opinions were in some sense inconsequential.
40
 Indeed, in the ear-
ly years of the republic, courts often issued their opinions orally, rather 
than in writing.
41
 They did not employ official reporters to transcribe, or 
even summarize, their opinions, and the unofficial reporters of decisions 
exercised significant discretion to exclude entire written or oral opi-
nions, or portions thereof, from the published volumes.
42
 And even those 
opinions that were published were not widely available to lawyers and 
judges.
43
 What is more, in the days before Chief Justice John Marshall, 
  
 37 For a discussion of cognitive dissonance in legal decisionmaking, see Donald C. Lange-
voort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature 
Review, 51 Vand L Rev 1499, 1505–06 (1998). 
 38 See, for example, Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A 
Comment on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U Det J Urb L 573, 576–79 (1981); Arthur 
L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L J 161, 162 (1930) (“The rea-
son which the judge gives for his decision is never the binding part of the precedent.”). 
 39 Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Präjudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 
Colum L Rev 199, 210 (1933) (noting that opinions are not even legally required in most states). 
 40 See Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 Notre Dame L Rev 1187, 
1190–1204 (2007). 
 41 See id at 1192, 1223. 
 42 See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 NYU L Rev 
123, 128–29 (1999).  
 43 See id at 129–30. 
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appellate courts—including the Supreme Court—did not even issue 
majority opinions. Rather, they issued their opinions seriatim, with no 
single opinion purporting to speak authoritatively for the court.
44
 
That time is long past. Although a number of legal theorists still 
consider opinions to be legally impotent,
45
 and although in a number 
of technical ways the court’s judgment, rather than its opinion, is the 
legally operative instrument of its decision,
46
 today, it cannot be gainsa-
id that judicial opinions matter.
47
 Cases are now generally understood 
to be more than simply a mechanism for resolving disputes between 
discrete parties. They also serve as a means of establishing rules that 
govern society.
48
 Their role is to establish (or at least articulate) legal 
rules of general applicability,
49
 and they fulfill that role through the 
mechanism of the written opinion.
50
 As Frederick Schauer has ex-
plained, a judicial opinion is an effort to give a reason for a decision, 
and inherent in the act of giving reasons is articulating principles at a 
heightened level of generality. To issue an opinion is to give a reason 
for the decision that is necessarily broader and more general than the 
specific facts of the case, and “to provide a reason for a decision is to 
include that decision within a principle of greater generality than the de-
cision itself.”
51
 Opinions thus “provide standards to guide lower courts in 
disposing of similar controversies that may arise in the future.”
52
  
  
 44 See Tiersma, 82 Notre Dame L Rev at 1230 (cited in note 40); Hartnett, 74 NYU L Rev 
at 133 (cited in note 42).  
 45 See, for example, Hartnett, 74 NYU L Rev at 126–36 (cited in note 42); Thomas W. Mer-
rill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L Rev 43, 44 
(1993) (arguing that for nonjudicial actors, judicial opinions are merely “legal essays that provide 
information useful in predicting what judgments courts will enter in future controversies”). See also 
Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U Pa L Rev 1997, 2036 n 143 (1994) (collecting authorities).  
 46 See Hartnett, 74 NYU L Rev at 126–28 (cited in note 42); Daniel John Meador and Jorda-
na Simone Bernstein, Appellate Courts in the United States 75–76 (West 1994) (“The opinion of an 
appellate court is the explanation of what the court is deciding; it is not a legally operative instru-
ment. The court’s formal action is embodied in its ‘judgment,’ a separate document directing the 
disposition of the case.”).  
 47 See Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 Houston L Rev 1143, 1150 (2007):  
[I]t is increasingly common in this country to treat opinions as the operative act of the 
court. While judgments continue to concern the parties (both in resolving the immediate 
dispute and affecting future suits under doctrines of preclusion), the rest of us worry not 
about the judgment but about the law made in the opinion.  
 48 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4, 
5–8 (1984) (“[T]oday cases are often just excuses for the creation or alteration of [societal] rules.”). 
 49 This is especially true of the Supreme Court. See, for example, Robert Post, The Su-
preme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in 
the Taft Court, 85 Minn L Rev 1267, 1273 (2001) (quoting Chief Justice William Howard Taft) 
(“The real work the Supreme Court has to do is for the public at large, as distinguished from the 
particular litigants before it.”). 
 50 See Sullivan, 43 Houston L Rev at 1161 (cited in note 47).  
 51 Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan L Rev 633, 641 (1994). Schauer elaborates: 
“When a court gives a reason, it typically either calls forth a preexisting rule that encompasses 
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Thus, today, “judges typically pay a great deal of attention to the 
words as well as the results of judicial decisions.”
53
 As a functional 
matter, judicial opinions themselves have the force of law.
54
 The rea-
sons that a court gives for its decision—the broader principles under 
which the court situates the facts and outcome of the case—are con-
trolling on future courts. The issuing court itself must accord them 
substantial,
55
 and in some cases complete,
56
 deference under principles 
of horizontal stare decisis, and lower courts are effectively bound by 
them under principles of vertical stare decisis.
57
 In addition, under the 
  
this case (as well as others) . . . or, if candidly acknowledging that it is making new law, it an-
nounces a new rule that includes cases other than the one at hand.” Id at 640. See also James 
Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U Chi L Rev 1363, 1366 (1995). 
 52 Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 Houston L Rev 1395, 1402 
(2000). Karl Llewellyn elaborates: “In our law the opinion has . . . a central forward-looking 
function which reaches far beyond the cause in hand: the opinion has as one if not its major 
office to show how like cases are properly to be decided in the future.” Karl N. Llewellyn, The 
Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 26 (Little, Brown 1960).  
 53 Dorf, 142 U Pa L Rev at 2037 (cited in note 45). As Dorf notes, many of the most con-
tentious disputes among Supreme Court justices take place in cases in which the justices agree on 
the result but differ sharply on the rationale for the decision. See id at 2037 n 145 (providing as an 
example R.A.V. v City of St Paul, 505 US 377 (1992)). The justices would not expend energy on 
those disputes if they understood only the result to make binding law. Similarly, the so-called Marks 
rule—that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds,’” Marks v United States, 
430 US 188, 193 (1977) (citation omitted)—is premised on the notion that the reasons laid down in 
the controlling opinion have consequences for subsequent courts. See Maltz, 37 Houston L Rev at 
1414 (cited in note 52) (arguing that the Marks decision demonstrates the Supreme Court’s willing-
ness to establish formal legal rules for both lower courts and nonjudicial actors). 
 54 See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 Am 
Bankr L J 109, 111 (1997) (“Whether it is in the development of common law, in the interpreta-
tion of statutes, or in enforcing the Constitution, courts frequently issue opinions that have the 
force of law.”). See also Tiersma, 82 Notre Dame L Rev at 1247 (cited in note 40) (“The lan-
guage of opinions is increasingly being viewed as authoritative text, not all that different from 
statutes.”); id:  
In the United States, . . . most lawyers have come to think of a precedent as something to be 
found in the text of a majority opinion. In fact, for many American lawyers the text of the 
majority opinion seems to have become synonymous with the notion of precedent. The out-
come of the case is almost an afterthought, something that matters only to the parties. 
 55 See, for example, County of Allegheny v ACLU, 492 US 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“As a general rule, the principle of stare 
decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explica-
tions of the governing rules of law.”). 
 56 See, for example, 6th Cir R 206(c) (“Reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent 
panels.”). 
 57 See, for example, United States v Underwood, 717 F2d 482, 486 (9th Cir 1983):  
The Supreme Court cannot limit its constitutional adjudication to the narrow facts before it 
in a particular case. In the decision of individual cases the Court must and regularly does es-
tablish guidelines to govern a variety of situations related to that presented in the imme-
diate case. The system could not function if lower courts were free to disregard such guide-
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Cooper v Aaron
58
 principle of judicial supremacy, the opinions of the 
courts purport to be the “supreme law of the land,” binding not only 
on other courts, but also on other branches of government.
59
 And final-
ly, the courts’ opinions operate “as a rule of conduct as well, to be fol-
lowed by individuals and entities rationally conducting their everyday 
affairs in ways they believe least likely to result in court-imposed pe-
nalties or most likely to result in court-bestowed gains.”
60
 
This creates a tension in our law.
61
 Article III’s case or controversy 
requirement precludes advisory opinions and requires courts to decide 
only concrete and narrow disputes between the litigants actually before 
the court.
62
 Yet in deciding narrow disputes, judges issue opinions that 
are necessarily broader in scope than the specific facts of the case. And 
those opinions have the force of law, controlling the result in future cas-
es, and requiring nonparties to alter their conduct to conform to the 
judges’ pronouncements. In some sense, then, every opinion is an advi-
sory opinion, insofar as it purports to, and functionally does, control 
other parties and other circumstances not actually before the court.
63
 
It might be suggested that the holding-dicta distinction can ame-
liorate this concern. Perhaps statements in the opinion broader than 
necessary to the resolution of the case can be treated as nonbinding 
dicta. But, regardless of whether the notoriously elusive line between 
holding and dicta can sensibly be pinned down,
64
 it is not likely to re-
solve the tension at hand. Even those propositions of law that are es-
sential to the decision and would qualify as holdings under any rea-
sonable definition of the term are of necessity broader than the nar-
row facts of the case and have the potential to dictate outcomes in 
  
lines whenever they did not precisely match the facts of the case in which the guidelines 
were announced. 
See also Tiersma, 82 Notre Dame L Rev at 1233 (cited in note 40) (“[L]ower courts must follow 
the decisions of judges above them in the hierarchy. From the perspective of the lower court 
judges, the word of the higher courts—in particular, the written word—is law.”).  
 58 358 US 1 (1958).  
 59 See id at 18 (holding that state officials must enforce the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling 
in Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954)).  
 60 Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 Colum L Rev 312, 361 (1997).  
 61 See, for example, Meir Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adju-
dication, 85 Colum L Rev 1, 4–5 (1985) (exploring different models of adjudication and the 
potential for tension when judges, who want to create forward-looking policy, are asked for a 
backward-looking resolution).  
 62 See Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 94–97 (1968).  
 63 See Schauer, 47 Stan L Rev at 655 (cited in note 51) (“[A] court giving reasons is deciding a 
class of cases not now before the court, and a class of cases for which the supposed crucible of expe-
rience is missing. Thus every time a court gives a reason it is, in effect, giving an advisory opinion.”).  
 64 See Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan L Rev 953, 
1044–45 (2005). 
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other cases.
65
 And in any event, many lower courts explicitly view 
themselves as bound by statements of dicta from higher courts.
66
 In 
addition, private and nonjudicial governmental actors will generally 
alter their conduct as the result of dicta if for no other reason than 
that dicta strongly indicate how the courts are likely to rule on the 
issue in the future; in most circumstances, it would be foolish to ignore 
the considered dicta of a controlling court.
67
 
The bottom line is thus that opinions issued in the narrow context 
of litigation have controlling effect well beyond the facts and the par-
ties before the court. In Justice William Brennan’s words, “While indi-
vidual cases turn upon the controversies between parties, or involve 
particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical con-
sequences upon members of society at large.”
68
 And yet, courts draft 
those opinions based typically on input only from the parties,
69
 who 
may have a narrow, idiosyncratic view of the issue, or who may be af-
fected by the resolution of the issue only in a peculiar way, or who 
simply may not be represented by particularly able counsel.  
This presents interrelated fairness and functional concerns. First, 
there are due process implications. The Supreme Court has declared 
  
 65 See Schauer, 47 Stan L Rev at 647–48 (cited in note 51). 
 66 See, for example, McCoy v Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 950 F2d 13, 19 (1st Cir 
1991) (“We think that federal appellate courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered 
dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings”); Lewis v Sava, 602 F Supp 571, 573 
(SDNY 1984) (“This court need not decide whether the statement in Chadha is dicta. Even if it 
is, in the absence of any clear authority to the contrary, the court is obliged to follow it.”). See 
Sullivan, 43 Houston L Rev at 1183–84 (cited in note 47); Maltz, 37 Houston L Rev at 1418–19 
(cited in note 52) (arguing that “the lower courts have often treated dicta from the Supreme 
Court as controlling”); Dorf, 142 U Pa L Rev at 2026 (cited in note 45) (explaining that some 
lower courts follow the dicta of the Supreme Court); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U 
Chi L Rev 682, 683 (1986):  
Fine distinctions between holding and dicta are rarely relevant; indeed, the very question of 
what the Court held at all becomes increasingly less important as we follow an opinion 
down the hierarchy. For when we are in the pit of actual application, we will discover that it 
is not what the Supreme Court held that matters, but what it said. In interpretive arenas be-
low the Supreme Court, one good quote is worth a hundred clever analyses of the holding.  
See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1177 (1989): 
Let us not quibble about the theoretical scope of a “holding”; the modern reality, at least, is 
that when the Supreme Court of the federal system, or of one of the state systems, decides a 
case, not merely the outcome of that decision, but the mode of analysis that it applies will 
thereafter be followed by the lower courts within that system, and even by that supreme 
court itself.  
 67 See Dorf, 142 U Pa L Rev at 2027–28 (cited in note 45). 
 68 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, 448 US 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan concurring). See 
also Hart v Massanari, 266 F3d 1155, 1176–77 (9th Cir 2001) (“Writing a precedential opi-
nion . . . involves much more than deciding who wins and who loses in a particular case. It is a 
solemn judicial act that sets the course of the law for hundreds or thousands of litigants and 
potential litigants.”). 
 69 The exception is amicus briefs, which we discuss in Part II.A.1.b.  
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that, when government bodies, including courts, “adjudicate or make 
binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of indi-
viduals, it is imperative that” they afford those individuals basic due 
process rights.
70
 Thus, for instance, the Court has been careful in devel-
oping the law of preclusion to insist that “[i]t is a violation of due 
process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party 
or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.”
71
 
And in developing the law of class actions, the Court has been careful 
to insist not only that, in order to meet the requirements of due process, 
class members who are not named plaintiffs “must receive notice plus 
an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation,” but also 
that “due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be 
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class” by 
“opting out” of the litigation, and finally that “the Due Process Clause 
of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately 
represent the interests of the absent class members.”
72
 
But, in a real sense, every appellate case is a de facto class action,
73
 
insofar as it determines the rights and responsibilities of many persons 
or entities that are not named parties in the case. And yet those absent 
“class members” frequently are not adequately represented by the 
named plaintiff, nor do they have a right to notice and the opportunity 
to be heard or to “opt out” of the litigation so as to avoid being bound 
by it. This raises serious concerns about the fairness and legitimacy of 
the judicial process. Of course, we do not mean to argue that this vi-
olates due process; it would be quite radical to insist that our system of 
precedent violates our Constitution. Our point is simply that many of 
the legitimate concerns that have animated the due process cases have 
broader implications than the courts generally acknowledge.
74
 
Second, functionally speaking, determining the rights of the many 
on the basis of a lawsuit between the few can produce bad results.
75
 
  
 70 Hanna v Larche, 363 US 420, 442 (1960). 
 71 Parklane Hosiery Co v Shore, 439 US 322, 327 n 7 (1979). 
 72 Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 812, 820 (1995).  
 73 See Miller, 58 U Det J Urb L at 574 (cited in note 38). Chief Justice Fred Vinson once 
admonished lawyers arguing before the Supreme Court to remember that they represent “not 
only [their] clients, but tremendously important principles upon which are based the plans, hopes 
and aspirations of a great many people throughout the country,” and thus that they are, “in a 
sense, prosecuting or defending class actions.” Id.  
 74 Consider Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U Colo L Rev 1011, 
1011–12 (2003) (arguing that a rigid application of stare decisis can deny due process to litigants 
who are bound by a prior case in which they had no opportunity to participate). 
 75 Our adversarial system is, of course, premised on the assumption that the opposite is 
true. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U Chi L Rev 883, 883 (2006) 
(“Moreover, so it is said, making law in the context of deciding particular cases produces law-
making superior to methods that ignore the importance of real litigants exemplifying the issues 
the law must resolve.”).  
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For one thing, if one or both of the parties’ lawyers happen not to be 
particularly competent or are venturing beyond their area of exper-
tise, then they may not give the court the best information and assis-
tance in resolving the issue. Moreover, excellent attorneys serving 
their clients well are often inclined to ignore or downplay information 
about the effects of a particular rule on other parties: “[T]he attor-
neys’ incentive is to present information designed to help win the case; 
so he may try to hide information [about adverse consequences of a 
proposed rule] or may not see the relevance of information needed 
for lawmaking.”
76
 In addition, cases where one party is particularly 
sympathetic and the other particularly unsympathetic (the type of cases 
often pushed for appellate decision by strategically inclined interest 
groups
77
) can generate rules that do more harm than good in the general 
run of cases.
78
 Establishing broad rules in narrow contexts can lead to 
rules that appear to make perfect sense as applied to the facts at bar, 
but are broad enough to cover other dissimilar situations in which they 
make much less sense. “Hard cases,” as the maxim goes, “make bad law.”
79
  
Tax lawyers and scholars, for instance, are famously fond of 
“complaining that the [Supreme] Court ‘hates tax cases’ and generally 
bungles the tax cases it does hear.”
80
 The problem, according to the tax 
bar, is that the Court simply does not understand the intricacies of the 
tax code—or even the fundamental underlying principles of tax law 
and policy.
81
 Accordingly, it often issues opinions that might appear 
  
 76 Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 27 (cited in note 20).  
 77 See Neal Devins and Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 Fla St 
U L Rev 323, 326–28 (2005). 
 78 See Schauer, 47 Stan L Rev at 656 (cited in note 51) (noting that appellate cases involv-
ing particular circumstances can generate rule-based opinions “whose array of results is, on 
balance, more detrimental than the good produced by the right result in the original case, such 
that it would have been better to reach the wrong result in the original case”).  
 79 Northern Securities Co v United States, 193 US 197, 400–01 (1904) (Holmes dissenting) 
(noting that the facts of the instant case can exert “a kind of hydraulic pressure” which “appeals 
to the feelings and distorts the judgment”). See also Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 23 
(cited in note 20). 
 80 See Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 Tax L Rev 
171, 173 (2001). See also Martin D. Ginsburg, The Federal Courts Study Committee on Claims 
Court Tax Jurisdiction, 40 Cath U L Rev 631, 634–35 (1991) (“[P]ractitioners cannot expect, and 
surely, as rational men and women, practitioners ought not to hope, that the Supreme Court will 
take too many tax cases. It is, history teaches, not a job the high court performs superbly.”); 
Charles L.B. Lowndes, Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1960 Sup Ct Rev 222, 222 (“It is 
time to rescue the Supreme Court from federal taxation; it is time to rescue federal taxation 
from the Supreme Court.”). 
 81 See, for example, William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor with No Clothes: The Supreme 
Court’s Tax Rules for Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L Rev 1685, 1688 (1994):  
What is it about the legal system that leads judges at the highest level, with the finest sup-
port from the smartest and best-trained of clerks and the elite players in the adversary sys-
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plausible, but may actually reflect a deep misunderstanding of tax 
concepts. And those opinions often have sweeping and chaos-inducing 
effects well beyond the narrow circumstances of the case at bar.
82
 Of 
course, the Court counts on the adversarial system to ameliorate these 
problems.
83
 But all too often, that system fails.
84
 The attorneys for the 
parties do not give the Court adequate information and guidance, ei-
ther because they have no incentive to address implications of a poss-
ible decision beyond its effects on their clients,
85
 because they are 
themselves unaware of the complexities of the case,
86
 or simply be-
cause they do not anticipate the peculiar resolution that the Court will 
eventually choose and thus cannot identify its problems ex ante.  
In some respects, these functional concerns may be reduced in 
less technical areas of law, where judges may have sound understand-
ings of the relevant issues, and where it seems less likely that there are 
“right” and “wrong” doctrinal answers. But even in nontechnical cases, 
judges often mistakenly place too much emphasis on the peculiar facts 
of the instant case and end up formulating a suboptimal general rule.
87
 
Psychological research has confirmed that this is a manifestation of a 
well-documented cognitive bias: people form their first impressions of 
an issue based on the context in which they first confront it (in the 
case of judges, from the facts of the case at bar), and they have an in-
grained tendency to overestimate the extent to which those circums-
tances are representative of the issue.
88
 
  
tem, to demonstrate such ignorance of, or disdain for, sound tax principles—principles that, 
once recognized, should be noncontroversial?  
 82 See, for example, Stark, 54 Tax L Rev at 256 (cited in note 80) (arguing that “the Su-
preme Court’s role in the tax field” is characterized by “the cost, chaos, and additional litigation 
that often follow its decisions”); Laura Saunders, The Agents Run Riot, Forbes 144 (Nov 9, 1992) 
(“[W]hat has the tax world up in arms is the absurdly broad language the justices used to rule in 
the government’s favor. . . . [T]he upheaval has created much uncertainty.”).  
 83 See Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon’s Den: A Failure of Judicial 
Process, 66 Cornell L Rev 1075, 1075 (1981): 
Hardly an enclave of tax experts, the Supreme Court relies for illumination and protection 
on the validity of a basic assumption about the adversary process: that strong and effective 
advocates bring the issues into focus and marshal the strongest arguments for each side, 
thus educating the Court and helping it reach the best result.  
 84 See id at 1076 (arguing that botched Supreme Court decisions “cast[] some doubt on the 
adversary system itself as a reliable vehicle for attaining justice in tax disputes and for producing 
sound and authoritative interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code”). 
 85 See, for example, Klein, 41 UCLA L Rev at 1725 (cited at note 81) (noting that the 
parties in tax cases focus on arguments based on existing precedents that will win the case; they 
have little incentive to offer more comprehensive and critical analysis). 
 86 See Wolfman, 66 Cornell L Rev at 1091–92 (cited in note 83). 
 87 See generally Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev 883 (cited in note 75). See also Devins and 
Meese, 32 Fla St L Rev at 328 (cited in note 77). 
 88 See Devins and Meese, 32 Fla St L Rev at 331–34 (cited in note 77). 
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In addition, less technical areas present their own concerns, especial-
ly when the issues are ideologically charged. In the academic literature on 
judicial decisionmaking, including both the political science literature on 
judicial politics
89
 and the law reviews,
90
 there is widespread agreement that 
the political affiliation of judges is at least partially predictive of case out-
comes. This does not mean that the legal system is hocus pocus, but rather 
that, at least on close issues, liberals and conservatives will sometimes 
favor different approaches. And especially in the lower courts, the polit-
ical identity of judges deciding any particular case may be attributed 
substantially to chance. This augments concerns about the effect of judi-
cial opinions: not only may they be decided without the input of the 
broader public that they affect, but they may also be written to reflect 
the ideology of judges who will not necessarily be politically repre-
sentative of that public. 
C. Legitimacy  
Thus far, we have identified three significant weaknesses in our 
judicial structure: the lack of meaningful participation by many who 
will be affected by judicial decisions; potential deficiencies in the flow 
of relevant and timely information to the court; and a lack of adequate 
constraint on idiosyncratic or ideological judicial decisionmaking. These 
concerns, which adversely affect both the parties and the general pub-
lic, threaten not only the quality of judicial decisionmaking, but also 
the legitimacy of the judicial process.  
The judiciary, as Alexander Hamilton famously noted, has the 
power of neither the purse nor the sword.
91
 In the Supreme Court’s 
words, “As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, 
the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money 
and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce ob-
edience to its decrees. The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy.”
92
  
That legitimacy is a tenuous commodity, particularly for un-
elected judges.
93
 Recent studies suggest that the public has serious 
  
 89 For a comprehensive overview, see Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology 
in American Courts: A Meta-analysis, 20 Just Sys J 219, 243 (1999). 
 90 See, for example, Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and 
Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 Nw U L Rev 743, 778 (2005) (“[T]hat ideology 
is a factor in judging, at least sometimes for some categories of cases and at least to some degree, 
has long been asserted by scholars and is further verified in recent studies.”). 
 91 Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist Papers 521, 523 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed). 
 92 Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 865 (1992).  
 93 See, for example, Maimon Schwarzchild, Keeping It Private, 44 San Diego L Rev 677, 687 
(2007) (arguing that the “problem of judges as lawmakers in a democratic society is a familiar 
one. Judges are not readily answerable to the electorate. Hence, judicial lawmaking is in tension 
with democratic legitimacy, if not at odds with it.”). 
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doubts about the legitimacy of the courts.
94
 Of course, those doubts 
have many causes, and indeed the entire notion of judicial “legitima-
cy” embraces a number of distinct concepts.
95
 But at least some of the 
public’s misgivings can be traced to the problems identified above, par-
ticularly the lack of meaningful participation by those who are affected 
by the court’s decision.  
Psychological and sociological research has suggested that the 
public’s acceptance of the legitimacy of the decisions of governmental 
bodies, including courts, depends upon its evaluation of the fairness of 
the decisionmaking process.
96
 Perceptions of procedural fairness, in turn, 
are highly dependent on whether those who are affected by a govern-
mental decision feel that they were given an adequate “voice” in the 
decisionmaking process.
97
 Thus, the public’s perception of the fairness 
and legitimacy of the legal process turns, in substantial part, on whether 
the public believes that those who will be affected have a fair opportu-
nity to have their voices heard and their arguments considered before 
the court reaches a final decision.
98
 
When a court decides a case on the basis of issues, authorities, or 
facts never raised by the parties, it loses legitimacy in the eyes of the 
parties and their attorneys, who feel that they have not had a fair op-
portunity to be heard.
99
 Likewise, when it ignores seemingly persuasive 
arguments or authorities relied upon by the parties, it undermines its 
  
 94 See, for example, Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The 
Findings of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DePaul L Rev 661, 692 (2007). 
 95 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv L Rev 1787, 1827–33 
(2005).  
 96 See, for example, Tyler, 56 DePaul L Rev at 663 (cited in note 94). 
 97 See id at 664 (identifying factors that the public considers when evaluating the fairness 
of procedural justice). See also Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 163 (Princeton 2006): 
One important element in feeling that procedures are fair is a belief on the part of those in-
volved that they had an opportunity to take part in the decision-making process. This in-
cludes an opportunity to present their arguments, being listened to, and having their views 
considered by authorities. Those who feel that they have had a hand in the decision are typ-
ically much more accepting of its outcome, irrespective of what the outcome is. 
 98 See Tyler, 56 DePaul L Rev at 664–67, 673–75 (cited in note 94); Marvell, Appellate 
Courts and Lawyers at 25 (cited in note 20).  
 99 See Miller, 39 San Diego L Rev at 1303 (cited in note 28). See also Milani and Smith, 69 
Tenn L Rev at 284 (cited in note 23): 
Sua sponte decisions work against such litigant and societal acceptance . . . because the los-
ing party will feel that he has not been given a fair opportunity to present his case when he 
had neither notice of, nor the chance to present[] arguments on[,] the issue that the court 
found determinative. 
Indeed, one study found that even winning lawyers feel that a court acts illegitimately when it 
decides in their favor based on an issue not raised by the parties. See Marvell, Appellate Courts 
and Lawyers at 125 (cited in note 20).  
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legitimacy in their eyes by silencing their voices.
100
 And more generally, 
when a court sets a precedent that binds third parties who never had 
an opportunity to shape the governing rule, it risks losing legitimacy in 
the eyes of the broader public.
101
  
The information and constraint problems that we have identified 
also contribute to doubts about judicial legitimacy. Studies have found 
that public perceptions of judicial legitimacy also depend in part on 
whether the public believes that the court “gets the kind of information 
it needs to make informed decisions,”
102
 and it has long been understood 
that perceptions of governmental legitimacy turn in substantial part on 
whether the government body is perceived to act arbitrarily.
103
 Accor-
dingly, both the deficiency in information flow to the courts and the lack 
of adequate constraints on idiosyncratic or ideological judicial deci-
sionmaking pose additional threats to the legitimacy of the judiciary.  
  
 100 See Oldfather, 94 Georgetown L J at 172 (cited in note 35). Chad Oldfather adds that 
the failure to explain why the parties’ arguments were rejected undermines “adjudicative legiti-
macy on a more global level” by failing to assure the public that future litigants will have their 
arguments taken seriously. Id. 
 101 Christopher Peters has argued that the active, participatory role of the parties in choos-
ing the issues to raise and the authorities upon which to rely—and thus in shaping the court’s 
decision—confers legitimacy on the courts with respect to the participating parties. See Peters, 97 
Colum L Rev at 347 (cited in note 60). He further argues that the common law method, pursuant 
to which stare decisis binds subsequent litigants only to the extent that they are similarly situated 
to the parties in the precedential case, such that their interests were adequately represented by 
the original parties, confers legitimacy on the courts with respect to third parties. See id. As Pe-
ters himself recognizes, however, his theory of judicial legitimacy depends upon three necessary 
conditions: first, that the court’s decision is actually the result of the choices of the parties as to 
which facts, issues, and authorities to emphasize; second, that a “precedential decision binds only 
those future parties who are similarly situated to the original litigants in every material way”; and 
third, that “the conduct of the parties in litigating the original precedential opinion meets a thre-
shold standard of adequacy.” Id at 375–76 (emphasis omitted). The failure to meet any or all of 
those conditions, explains Peters, undermines the judiciary’s claim to legitimacy. See id. Likewise, 
he argues, courts undermine their legitimacy whenever they “attempt to articulate general rules 
that will govern future cases,” id at 400, 402, 410, and whenever they issue broad decisions in 
constitutional cases “of tremendous import,” id at 412. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, 
Peters’s necessary conditions are often not met in the real world of contemporary judicial deci-
sionmaking, and courts often engage in the very practices that he identifies as undercutting his 
defense of their legitimacy.  
 102 See Tyler, 56 DePaul L Rev at 680–82, 681 n 126 (cited in note 94). 
 103 See, for example, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legi-
timacy in the Administrative State, 78 NYU L Rev 461, 492–503 (2003) (arguing that concerns 
about government arbitrariness are central to the constitutional structure and to the legitimacy 
of administrative agencies); Scalia, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1178 (cited in note 66) (arguing that the 
same is true of the judiciary). 
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II.  INADEQUATE EXISTING MECHANISMS AND THE NOTICE-AND-
COMMENT ALTERNATIVE 
In Part I, we identified concerns that judicial decisions might be 
made on the basis of imperfect information, for idiosyncratic or ideo-
logical reasons, or with affected parties having had insufficient oppor-
tunity to shape the rules that effectively bind them. A number of exist-
ing mechanisms help to answer these concerns, but, we argue in 
Part II.A, they are only partly successful. In Part II.B, we explain how 
a notice-and-comment regime might work and how this regime would 
be more responsive to the concerns identified above. 
A. The Inadequacy of Existing Mechanisms 
A number of existing mechanisms do give parties and nonparties 
opportunities to participate in litigation, helping to inform, constrain, 
and ultimately legitimate the judiciary. These mechanisms succeed to a 
substantial degree. Nonetheless, both alone and in combination, they 
are incomplete, and this incompleteness detracts from judicial efficacy 
and legitimacy. Part II.A considers a number of existing mechanisms, 
including litigant and third-party participation, aspects of judicial deli-
beration, and review of judgments, and explains why they are inade-
quate to the task of informing, constraining, and legitimating the judi-
ciary. In Part II.B, we explain how notice and comment addresses 
these limitations. 
1. Litigant and third-party participation. 
a) Parties’ briefs. The most significant mechanism for providing 
information to the court about the relevant facts and authorities, and 
about the best rule of decision, is the parties’ briefs. The briefs are also 
the most important mechanism for giving the parties a voice in the 
decisionmaking process. Their informational and legitimacy-
conferring value is thus powerful, but it is nonetheless limited.  
The parties use their briefs to try to steer the court in a particular 
direction. But sometimes the court ends up going somewhere else al-
together. In drafting its opinion, the court might seize upon facts, legal 
authorities, issues, or arguments that the parties did not anticipate.
104
 
When that occurs, the already-filed briefs are of no use in informing 
the court of reasons why those facts, authorities, or arguments are 
invalid or inapposite. At that point, the briefs: fail to provide the in-
formation necessary for the best resolution of the dispute; fail to pro-
vide legitimacy in the eyes of the parties, who were given no voice in 
  
 104 See Part I.A. 
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the actual grounds of the court’s decision; and fail to constrain the 
court because it felt no obligation to confine itself to the issues and 
authorities relied upon by the parties.  
In addition, the parties’ briefs are often systematically deficient in 
providing the court with information necessary for its lawmaking 
function—its effort to articulate rules to govern third parties.
105
 As 
noted above, skillful lawyers, who are concerned more with obtaining 
a successful resolution of the instant dispute than with establishing a 
sensible norm to govern future interactions among persons whom 
they do not represent, will often downplay information about the du-
bious effects of a proposed rule on other parties.
106
 
To make matters worse, lawyers are not, of course, always particu-
larly skillful. As Judge Irving Kaufman once remarked,  
In our adversary system, the quality of justice dispensed by the 
courts is ultimately dependent on the quality of advocacy pro-
vided by the bar. If lawyers fail as advocates for want of skill or 
dedication, then judges will surely fail as well, and the coin of jus-
tice will be debased beyond recognition.
107
  
To hear judges tell it, the debasement is rampant. Studies have found 
that judges as a whole “are not at all pleased with the general run of 
briefs,”
108
 and judges often find that the briefs do not provide adequate 
information to resolve the case.
109
 
Worse still, the quality of lawyering is often uneven: one lawyer is 
more skilled than the other. As a result, the court is provided with lop-
sided information, which often leads to skewed results.
110
 From the stand-
point of the party with the better lawyers, that may not be so bad: the 
whole point of hiring the best and the brightest lawyers is to maximize 
the chance of winning.
111
 But from the standpoint of third parties who 
are affected by the court’s ruling, such imbalances are less tolerable. It 
  
 105 See Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 47 (cited in note 20) (“Lawyers in normal 
appeals often incompletely inform the courts; yet the cases are decided and law is made.”). 
 106 See note 76 and accompanying text.  
 107 Irving Kaufman, The Court Needs a Friend in Court, 60 ABA J 175, 175 (1974). See also 
Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 28 (cited in note 20) (“[A]ppellate judges often say 
that the quality of their work depends on greatly on the quality of counsel’s work.”).  
 108 Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 29 (cited in note 20) (basing this conclusion on 
private interviews and published writings of appellate judges). The “great majority” of law clerks 
also find the parties’ briefs “terrible, worthless,” and “abhorrent.” Id.  
 109 See note 22 and accompanying text. 
 110 See Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 37–40 (cited in note 20) (concluding that 
there is a “strong possibility that the adversary system operates substantially in favor of lawyers 
who do a better job”). 
 111 On the other hand, the fact that some parties can afford better, and more, lawyering than 
others can create imbalances that undermine the fairness of even the dispute resolution function of 
the courts. See, for example, David Luban, Lawyers and Justice 50–58 (Princeton 1988).  
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is difficult to see the virtue in, or legitimacy of, a legal system in which 
people are bound by a bad rule that was established only because 
some other party once hired an incompetent lawyer in a case in which 
those who are now bound had no involvement. 
b) Amicus briefs. Of course, amicus briefs help to address the 
concerns of third parties, both in providing relevant information and 
in contributing to the legitimacy of a court’s decision. A nonparty that 
fears that it might be adversely affected by a court’s ruling is free to 
seek permission to participate as amicus curiae in order to provide 
relevant information to the court and have a meaningful say in the 
court’s decision.  
In many respects, amicus briefs have proven to be quite helpful in 
guiding and legitimating the court’s lawmaking function. There has 
been no shortage of praise in the legal literature for the ability of ami-
cus briefs to “inform the court of implications of a decision or to point 
out unintended consequences for people or groups not party to the 
suit.”
112
 Amicus briefs, it is said, provide relevant factual information 
not offered by the parties, bring to bear expertise that the parties and the 
courts do not have, address “points deemed too far-reaching for emphasis 
by a party intent on winning a particular case,” and “explain the impact a 
potential holding might have on an industry or other group.”
113
 In short, 
they “give a voice to persons who are not parties but who may be af-
fected by a decision,”
114
 which helps to give broader legitimacy to the 
court’s decision.
115
 In addition, they “serve an important function in 
bringing social science evidence to the attention of the courts.”
116
 
  
 112 See Victor E. Flango, Donald C. Bross, and Sarah Corbally, Amicus Curiae Briefs: The 
Court’s Perspective, 27 Just Sys J 180, 181 (2006). See also Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empiri-
cal Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarial-
ism, 27 Rev Litig 669, 674 (2008) (“Insights offered by amici curiae tend to extend beyond the 
interests of the parties to the litigation . . . and are generally aimed at protecting the interests of 
individuals or organizations who are absent from the proceedings but whose interests are poten-
tially jeopardized by the litigation.”); James F. Spriggs II and Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae 
and the Role of Information at the Supreme Court, 50 Polit Rsrch Q 365, 367 (1997):  
To fulfill their policy goals, the Court’s members require information about the potential 
consequences of alternative decisions. Since litigants are more likely to be narrowly focused 
on the case outcome, the broader policy ramifications of the decision may not be discussed 
in their briefs. In contrast, amicus briefs may provide this information and help the Court’s 
members understand the policy implications of their rulings.  
(citation omitted).  
 113 Luther T. Munford, When Does the Curiae Need an Amicus?, 1 J App Prac & Process 
279, 281 (1999). 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 Fla St U L Rev 315,   
338–47 (2008); Peters, 97 Colum L Rev at 417–18 (cited in note 60). 
 116 Garcia, 35 Fla St U L Rev at 340 (cited in note 115). 
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On the whole, judges find amicus briefs helpful.
117
 And one can 
surely point to examples of cases in which the additional information 
and perspective offered by amici appear to have affected a court’s 
opinion.
118
 For instance, the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v Bol-
linger,
119
 upholding the constitutionality of the University of Michigan 
Law School’s affirmative action admissions program, appears to have 
been influenced by an amicus brief filed on behalf of retired military 
generals who argued that an adverse decision for the University of 
Michigan would put an end to affirmative action in higher education 
generally, which would undermine diversity in ROTC programs and 
the military academies, which in turn would exacerbate racial tensions 
between officers and enlisted ranks, which would ultimately threaten 
national security.
120
 At oral argument, the justices posed nineteen ques-
tions about the generals’ brief, and the Court ultimately cited and di-
rectly quoted at length from the brief repeatedly in its opinion.
121
 
But it would be a mistake to read too much into these examples. 
In the general mine of cases, there are serious limits to the informa-
tional value of amicus briefs, particularly their ability to inform the 
court of the adverse consequences of its preferred course of action. 
Some empirical studies have found that “the amount of new informa-
tion in . . . amicus briefs is quite limited,”
122
 and others have found that 
the new information contained in amicus briefs generally does not 
  
 117 See US S Ct R 37.1 (“An amicus curiae brief which brings relevant matter to the atten-
tion of the Court that has not already been brought to its attention by the parties is of consider-
able help to the Court.”); Simard, 27 Rev Litig at 690–93 (cited in note 112) (presenting the 
results of a survey of federal judges that found broad agreement that amicus briefs are useful in 
offering legal arguments that are missing from the briefs and in focusing the court’s attention on 
the potential impact of the decision on nonparties); Flango, Bross, and Corbally, 27 Just Sys J at 
187 (cited in note 112) (presenting the results of a survey of state high court judges and clerks 
that found that 95 percent of respondents believed amicus briefs to be useful in informing the 
court of policy considerations, and 75 percent of the respondents believed amicus briefs to be a 
useful source of social science research and data); Justice Breyer Calls for Experts to Aid Courts 
in Complex Cases, NY Times A17 (Feb 17, 1998) (quoting Justice Stephen Breyer) (“[Amicus] 
briefs play an important role in educating judges on potentially relevant technical matters, help-
ing to make us not experts but educated lay persons and thereby helping to improve the quality 
of our decisions.”).  
 118 See, for example, Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483, 494 n 11 (1954) (citing psy-
chological studies on the effects of segregation on children that were called to the attention of 
the Court in the Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU, et al, Brown v Board of Education, *17–18 (US filed 
Nov 28, 1955)). See also Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 Cath U L Rev 603, 603 (1984) 
(“Amicus Briefs have shaped judicial decisions in many more cases than is commonly realized.”). 
 119 539 US 306 (2003). 
 120 See generally Consolidated Brief of Amici Curiae Lt Gen Julius W. Becton, Jr, et al, in 
Support of Respondents, Grutter v Bollinger, No 02-241 (US filed Feb 19, 2003). 
 121 See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters before and within the Supreme Court: Trans-
forming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Georgetown L J 1487, 1544 (2008).  
 122 Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 80 (cited in note 20). 
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tend to drive the court’s decision or shape its opinion.
123
 The fact that 
the public has a chance to participate as amici curiae is of limited value 
because amicus briefs—just like the parties’ briefs—must be filed in 
advance of the court’s drafting its opinion. Because the court may re-
solve the case in unanticipated ways, or employ unanticipated language, 
it can catch affected third parties by surprise. One often cannot know 
how (or even if) one will be affected by a judicial opinion until it is pub-
lished—at which point, under our current system, it is too late to object.  
For that same reason, the ability of amicus briefs to legitimate the 
court in the eyes of third parties is limited: nonparties are often af-
fected by opinions in cases in which they had no impetus to partici-
pate, and even those nonparties who do participate as amici are often 
unable to anticipate and preemptively respond to the actual language 
or rationale employed by the court. That lack of legitimacy is com-
pounded by the fact that, even when a case can be identified ex ante as 
potentially undermining third party interests, the ability to participate is 
not shared equally by all interests in society. Because it is costly to iden-
tify cases in which a court decision might possibly affect one’s interests, 
and then to file amicus briefs preemptively in all of those cases, interests 
that are neither well-funded nor well-organized are much less likely to 
be able to have their voices heard through amicus participation.
124
 
c) Joinder, intervention, and class actions. If amicus participation is 
inadequate, those who might be affected could seek a greater voice and 
an opportunity to participate through more direct participation or repre-
sentation: either by joining or intervening in the case or through repre-
sentation as absent class members in a class action.
125
 But those mechan-
isms are generally not able to protect the interests of most third parties. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
126
 require a party to be joined 
in an action whenever “that person claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in 
  
 123 See Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 50 Polit Rsrch Q at 382–83 (cited in note 112). 
 124 See Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on 
the Supreme Court, 148 U Pa L Rev 743, 746–47 (2000) (noting that “well-organized interest 
groups will be more likely to file amicus briefs than will diffuse and poorly organized interests,” 
and that “over-representation of well-organized interest groups through amicus filings may have 
an influence in the outcomes reached by courts”). 
 125 See Peters, 97 Colum L Rev at 418 & n 372 (cited in note 60) (suggesting that liberal use 
of intervention and joinder can increase judicial legitimacy). 
 126 State procedural rules often closely resemble the federal rules, see generally John B. 
Oakley and Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of 
Civil Procedure, 61 Wash L Rev 1367 (1986), and even when a state’s rules appear to be nominal-
ly different, in practice state courts generally employ the same basic procedural rules as the 
federal courts, see Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A 
Survey of Intra-state Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 46 Vill L Rev 311, 319 (2001). 
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the person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or impede 
the person’s ability to protect the interest,” so long as joinder is feasi-
ble.
127
 Read literally, that might suggest mandatory joinder of any party 
who stands to be bound by any precedent that might be set in the in-
stant litigation. But, of course, the rule could not be, and has never 
been, read in that manner. It applies, instead, only to circumstances in 
which the party has an interest in the actual factual dispute, rather 
than merely the underlying legal principles, at issue in the case.
128
  
The Federal Rules further provide that a party has a right to in-
tervene in an action if the disposition of the action “may as a practical 
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, 
unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”
129
 But that 
rule applies only if the party “claims an interest relating to the proper-
ty or transaction that is the subject of the action.”
130
 The Rules do al-
low permissive intervention for any party who “has a claim or defense 
that shares with the main action a common question of law.”
131
 That 
rule is more lenient and “plainly dispenses with any requirement that 
the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the 
subject of the litigation.”
132
 Commentators have thus suggested that 
intervention may be appropriate where the moving party “wishe[s] to 
avoid the creation of a precedent that might someday come back to 
haunt him.”
133
 But intervention is feasible only for a small number of 
parties, and it is appropriate only when the moving party has an ac-
tual, live, justiciable claim or defense against a party already involved 
in the case.
134
 Most third parties who stand to be affected by the crea-
tion of a precedent do not fall into this narrow category, and thus can-
not take advantage of intervention.  
Similar problems limit the effectiveness of the class action as a 
means of protecting the interests of parties not actually before the 
court. The class action device is available to protect the interests of 
large numbers of parties when “there are questions of law . . . common 
  
 127 FRCP 19(a). 
 128 See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 7 Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1604 (West 3d ed 2001). The Rules also allow permissive joinder of plaintiffs or 
defendants if “any question of law” common to all plaintiffs or defendants will arise in the action, 
but only if the claims all “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions 
or occurrences.” FCRP 20(a). 
 129 FRCP 24(a). 
 130 Id. 
 131 FRCP 24(b). 
 132 See SEC v United States Realty & Improvement Co, 310 US 434, 459 (1940) (discussing 
the ability of a party to intervene in bankruptcy proceedings). 
 133 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 7C Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1911 (West 3d ed 2007). 
 134 See id at §§ 1911, 1914. 
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to the class.”
135
 But a class action can be employed only when “the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class” and “the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
136
 As such, the 
concerns addressed above—that often the claims of the parties to the 
case that sets the precedent are very different from the claims of those 
who will be bound by it, and that the parties often do not adequately 
represent the interests of everyone who will be bound by the rule—are 
not ameliorated by the class action. Indeed, in most cases, the vast ma-
jority of persons who will be affected by the precedent set in the litiga-
tion do not currently have justiciable claims against the actual parties in 
the case, and therefore could not possibly become members of the class.  
d) Oral argument. Another source of information and potential 
participatory legitimacy for a court is oral argument.
137
 In some re-
spects, oral argument is an important supplement to briefing. Often, 
even after reading the briefs, judges “still face some degree of uncer-
tainty regarding what are generally complex legal and factual issues.”
138
 
They still “need an understanding of the legal status quo, the policy 
choices available to them, [and] the likely effect that different legal 
rulings will have on the litigants and other similarly situated parties.”
139
 
Oral argument provides the judges with an opportunity to fill in these 
gaps in their understanding of the case.
140
 And just as importantly, it 
provides the parties with an opportunity to become aware of, and to 
address, the judges’ concerns. While the parties file their briefs in ig-
norance of the judges’ actual thinking about the issues in the case, at 
oral argument, the judges sometimes inform the lawyers of their initial 
impression of the case. This gives the lawyers an opportunity to chal-
lenge the court’s understanding and to provide relevant factual or le-
gal authority that contradicts or alters it.
141
 Not surprisingly, then, both 
  
 135 FRCP 23(a). See also Thomas R. Grande, Class Actions in State Courts—A Tool for the 
Trial Advocate, 23 Am J Trial Advoc 491, 495 n 17 (2000) (“[T]he vast majority of state class 
action rules are modeled after Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23.”).  
 136 FRCP 23(a). 
 137 See Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs, II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, Oral Advocacy be-
fore the United States Supreme Court: Does It Affect the Justices’ Decisions?, 85 Wash U L Rev 
457, 459 n 8 (2007) (noting that “even though oral arguments may not control the outcome of a 
case in terms of changing votes, they may provide key information to the Justices”). 
 138 Id at 462. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 245 (Knopf 2d ed 2001) (“One can do his 
level best to digest from the briefs . . . what he believes necessary to decide the case, and still find 
himself falling short in one aspect or another of either the law or the facts. Oral argument can 
cure these shortcomings.”).  
 141 See, for example, Johnson, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck, 85 Wash U L Rev at 463 (cited in note 
137) (“While the briefs may address almost every legal intricacy, counsel cannot always know 
what information the Justices want. It is only during oral arguments, then, that Justices can dis-
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anecdotal accounts and empirical data show that oral argument can 
impact judicial opinions.
142
 
Still, as an informational resource and a legitimating device, oral 
argument leaves much to be desired. To begin with, third parties gen-
erally cannot participate in oral argument, and thus have no ability to 
inform the court that, if it continues in the direction that it appears to 
be leaning, its decision might have far-reaching, undesirable, and per-
haps unintended consequences. That is to say, oral argument does 
nothing to address the drawbacks associated with relying upon the 
parties to provide the court with knowledge of how its opinion could 
affect others—and it does nothing to address the concern that third 
parties have no say in the shaping of the rules that will bind them.  
What is more, oral argument is not even a good mechanism for 
the parties themselves, acting in their own interests, to steer a mis-
guided court in the right direction. The lawyers begin oral argument in 
the dark about the judges’ views of the case.
143
 Because they often did 
not anticipate the judges’ questions, and because they are expected to 
come up with answers immediately, off the top of their heads, they gen-
erally do not offer the best responses.
144
 Justice Robert Jackson—one of 
history’s great appellate advocates prior to taking the bench—once re-
marked that, despite his herculean preparation, he invariably found his 
  
cuss with counsel those points that pique their interests.”); Charles A. Rothfeld, Avoiding Mis-
steps in the Supreme Court: A Guide to Resources for Counsel, 7 J App Prac & Process 249, 252 
(2005) (quoting Justice Scalia) (“I use [oral argument] to give counsel his or her best shot at 
meeting my major difficulty with that side of the case. ‘Here’s what’s preventing me from going 
along with you. If you can explain why that’s wrong, you have me.’”); William H. Rehnquist, Oral 
Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, 35 Mercer L Rev 1015, 1021 (1984) (noting that, at oral argument, 
“[c]ounsel can play a significant role in responding to the concerns of the judges, concerns that 
counsel won’t always be able to anticipate in preparing the briefs”).  
 142 See, for example, Johnson, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck, 85 Wash U L Rev at 499 (cited in note 
137) (concluding on the basis of an empirical examination of Justice Blackmun’s notes from oral 
argument that “oral advocacy has a generally large and robust effect on the way in which Su-
preme Court Justices vote”); Robert L. Stern, et al, Supreme Court Practice 671 (BNA 8th ed 
2002) (quoting Justice Brennan) (“Often my idea of how a case shapes up is changed by oral 
argument.”); David O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 282 (WW 
Norton 4th ed 1996) (quoting Justice Scalia) (“Things . . . can be put in perspective during oral 
argument in a way that they can’t be in a written brief.”); Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy before 
the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentation, 37 ABA J 801, 801 (1951) (“I 
think the Justices would answer unanimously that . . . they rely heavily on oral presentations. . . . 
[Oral argument] is of the highest, and often of controlling, importance.”).  
 143 See Hummels, 46 Ariz L Rev at 318 (cited in note 10) (noting that “advocates commonly 
enter argument at least partly guessing which issues the court finds most important, which cases 
the most relevant, and which arguments the most forceful”); Marvell, Appellate Courts and Law-
yers at 78 (cited in note 20).  
 144 See Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the 
Conventional Wisdom, 72 Iowa L Rev 1, 24 (1986) (“Realistically, one should not expect the 
average attorney to respond effectively to unanticipated questions, relying solely on memory, 
without an opportunity to reflect on either the question or the response.”). 
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oral arguments to be “disjointed” and “disappointing,” and he only 
came up with the best answers to the judges’ questions after the argu-
ment had ended.
145
 For this reason, oral argument does not give the par-
ties a particularly effective opportunity to address the concerns of the 
judges, and thus it often fails to provide the judges with the information 
that they need.
146
 As Robert Martineau has written, “[A] short oral ar-
gument is hardly the most appropriate time to obtain a thoughtful re-
sponse from counsel about a novel idea. Attorneys will be far more like-
ly to give a reasoned response if given the opportunity to reflect on the 
idea, review the record, and do additional research.”
147
 
Finally, even the best attorneys cannot anticipate at oral argu-
ment exactly how the court’s opinion will eventually be written. As 
such, they cannot possibly inform the court of all of the unintended or 
undesirable consequences of its not-yet-crafted words.
148
  
2. Judicial deliberation and work product. 
a)  Law clerks’ and judges’ research. Another source of informa-
tion in our legal system is the research performed by judges, their law 
clerks, and staff attorneys. Judges and clerks can and often do uncover 
both factual and legal authorities that the parties and amici over-
looked.
149
 But in the face of ballooning dockets and crushing work-
loads, judges and their staffs simply do not have the time to do as 
much thorough research of the facts and the law as they might ideally 
prefer.
150
 And, as the Supreme Court’s Kennedy v Louisiana decision 
discussed at the outset of this Article reminds us, even the best judges 
with the best law clerks can sometimes fail to uncover important in-
formation.
151
 What is more, to the extent that judges rely on their own 
research in lieu of the input of the parties, they exacerbate the legiti-
macy concerns that result when affected parties feel that their voices 
are not being heard in the decisionmaking process. 
b)  Opinions. A judicial opinion is not, of course, a source of in-
formation for the court; it is the work product that results when the 
court processes the information that it has received. But publishing an 
opinion can help ameliorate legitimacy concerns. The opinion allows 
  
 145 Jackson, 37 ABA J at 803 (cited in note 142). 
 146 See Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 75 (cited in note 20). See also id at 29, 33–34 
(noting that judges are generally disappointed in the quality of oral advocacy in their courtrooms). 
 147 Martineau, 72 Iowa L Rev at 16 (cited in note 144). 
 148 See Stern, et al, Supreme Court Practice at 729 (cited in note 142) (noting that some 
opinions will have “unanticipated consequences,” but “obviously, counsel cannot readily identify 
such cases in advance of the Court’s action”). 
 149 See Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 88, 94–95, 133–36 (cited in note 20).  
 150 See id at 19–20.  
 151 See Introduction. See also notes 80–86 and accompanying text (discussing tax law). 
File: Abramowicz 10-6 Created on: 10/6/2009 10:13:00 PM Last Printed: 10/6/2009 10:59:00 PM 
994 The University of Chicago Law Review [76:965 
the judges to explain their reasoning. If the parties see from the opi-
nion that their arguments have been taken seriously, then they may be 
more likely to accept the result, even if it is an unfavorable one.
152
  
An opinion also advances the goal of judicial constraint. It does 
so by limiting idiosyncratic or ideological decisionmaking in two ways. 
First, the mere act of drafting an opinion—crafting a coherent and 
believable explanation of how a decision flows from the relevant facts 
and legal authorities—can sometimes ensure that the decision accords 
with the governing law. Often, a judge will discover an error in reason-
ing when she realizes that the opinion “just won’t write” as she had 
conceived it.
153
 In this regard, the act of writing the opinion can help to 
overcome her cognitive biases
154
 by forcing sufficient cognitive atten-
tion to counterarguments that she might otherwise have dismissed too 
quickly. Writing an opinion can prompt her to change the disposition 
of the case from her instinctively preferred result to one that is (or at 
least that she now believes to be) compelled by the law. 
Second, the opinion can constrain the judge because she knows 
that others might dissect its reasoning. Professional pride may prec-
lude her from deviating too far from the controlling authorities and 
the norms of legal decisionmaking. As Judge Patricia Wald once put it:  
[The opinion writing] process, more than the vote at conference 
or the courtroom dialogue, puts the writer on the line, reminds 
her with each tap of the key that she will be held responsible for 
the logic and persuasiveness of the reasoning and its implications 
for the larger body of circuit or national law.
155
  
  
 152 Consider Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative 
Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 Harv L Rev 410, 412 (1978) (noting that the norm that an 
“adjudicator should explain his decision in a manner that provides a substantive reply to what 
the parties have to say . . . help[s] to satisfy the loser that the decision is not arbitrary” and 
“giv[es] assurance that the adjudicator has in fact attended” to “what the parties have to say”). 
 153 See Oldfather, 94 Georgetown L J at 178 (cited in note 35) (“[M]any judges have ob-
served that a decision that once seemed perfectly reasonable can often turn out to be considera-
bly less so following an attempt to write a justification.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of 
Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U Chi L Rev 1371, 1374–75 (1995):  
Even when judges agree on a proposed result after reading briefs and hearing argument, 
the true test comes when the writing judge reasons it out on paper (or on computer). . . . It 
is not so unusual to modulate, transfer, or even switch an originally intended rationale or 
result in midstream because “it just won’t write.”  
See also Robert J. Traynor, Some Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U Chi L 
Rev 211, 218 (1957).  
 154 See note 37 and accompanying text.  
 155 Wald, 62 U Chi L Rev at 1375 (cited in note 153). See also David L. Shapiro, In Defense 
of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv L Rev 731, 737 (1987) (“A requirement that judges give reasons for 
their decisions—grounds of decision that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital 
function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power.”); Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradi-
tion at 26 (cited in note 52) (noting that a judicial opinion “serves as a steadying factor which 
 
File: Abramowicz 10-6 Created on: 10/6/2009 10:13:00 PM Last Printed: 10/6/2009 10:59:00 PM 
2009] Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking 995 
In this regard, opinion writing can reduce the risk “that there is a 
reason for the result, albeit a legally, socially or morally impermissible 
one.”
156
 A court is less likely, for example, to choose a path inconsistent 
with precedent when it has the obligation to explain its decision. 
For these reasons, the mechanism of the written opinion presum-
ably reduces the risk that judges will not notice an argument, will con-
veniently neglect to mention it, will gloss over it, or will reject it on 
spurious grounds. But the opinion does not eliminate those risks. The 
persistence of ideological decisionmaking in our judiciary,
157
 despite 
the practice of opinion writing, shows that drafting opinions can do 
only so much to constrain judges. The law is often sufficiently unclear 
that the opinion “will write” either way, such that the judge fails to 
uncover potential pitfalls in reasoning in the course of drafting it. In 
law, it is often debatable what counts as a sufficiently rigorous argu-
ment, and cognitive consistency bias may lead the judge to offer sim-
plistic answers to complex arguments in an opinion without anticipat-
ing the efficacy of future criticism. 
For these same reasons, the opinion only incompletely remedies 
deficiencies in the court’s legitimacy. When the parties are left with the 
impression that serious arguments were not taken seriously, they ques-
tion the meaningfulness of their participation and thus the legitimacy 
of the decision.
158
 That problem is more severe still in the many cases 
in which no opinion is written, or in which an opinion does not even 
purport to provide a fully explanatory legal analysis.
159
 And when full 
  
aids reckonability,” because “[i]f I cannot give a reason I should be willing to stand to, I must 
shrink from the very result which otherwise seems good”). 
 156 Schauer, 47 Stan L Rev at 652 (cited in note 51). 
 157 See notes 89–90 and accompanying text.  
 158 See Part I.C.  
 159 See, for example, David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman, and Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Dock-
etology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 Wash U L Rev 681, 682 (2007) (reporting the results of 
an empirical study of district court opinions that found that “only 3% of all orders, and only 17% 
of orders applying facts to law, are fully reasoned”). A court, for example, will often issue a sum-
mary opinion that does not fully explain why the arguments offered by a party have been re-
jected. See Caleb E. Mason, An Aesthetic Defense of the Nonprecedential Opinion: The Easy 
Cases Debate in the Wake of the 2007 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
55 UCLA L Rev 643, 644 n 2 (2008) (noting that over 80 percent of all opinions issued by the 
federal courts of appeals are unpublished); W. Warren H. Binford, et al, Seeking Best Practices 
among Intermediate Courts of Appeal: A Nascent Journey, 9 J App Prac & Process 37, 84 (2007) 
(noting similar percentages for state appellate courts); Arthur D. Hellman, The View from the 
Trenches: A Report on the Breakout Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, 
8 J App Prac & Process 141, 173 (2006) (“[W]hen an opinion is designated as ‘not for publica-
tion,’ the panel is permitted—and indeed often encouraged—to provide only a skeletal state-
ment of the facts (perhaps not even that) and a conclusory statement of the rationale.”); Chad M. 
Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 Fla L Rev 
743, 773 (2006) (“Not infrequently, the courts dispense with opinions altogether, simply issuing 
an order indicating that the lower court disposition is affirmed.”); Arthur D. Hellman, The View 
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opinions are written, they have binding effects on third parties who 
had no say in shaping them, thus threatening the court’s legitimacy in 
the eyes of the broader public.
160
 
c)  Multi-judge panels. Another possible source of judicial con-
straint is the use of multi-judge panels. Using Chevron
161
 cases as their 
dataset, Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller have found that ideologically 
unified appellate panels (consisting of three Democratic-appointed or 
three Republican-appointed judges) are considerably more ideologi-
cal than ideologically split panels.
162
 Cross and Tiller theorize that the 
minority party judge may serve a “whisteblower” function—calling the 
majority judges out when they allow ideology to influence their legal 
analysis. In the Chevron context, majority judges might like to ignore 
the Chevron instruction to defer to reasonable agency interpretations, 
but the presence of a potentially whistleblowing minority party judge 
may deter this. More generally, panel diversity may moderate ideologi-
cal decisionmaking in tension with legal requirements. Subsequent re-
search has shown that both a judge’s own political affiliation and the 
political affiliation of other judges on the appellate panel are significant 
predictors of that judge’s vote (not just the decision of the panel as a 
whole).
163
 Cognitive consistency bias can be overcome if another panel 
judge can point out the flaws in a judge’s tentative analysis.  
Recognizing the possibility that whistleblowing may usefully help 
thwart ideological outcomes, Cross and Tiller suggest that panels be 
selected in a way that ensures that there are never three Republican 
or three Democratic judges on a particular panel.
164
 That proposal 
would increase the chance that judges will face exposure from another 
judge with a different ideological perspective if they take a position 
with weak support. But it is not the current practice. Trial courts typi-
cally consist of only one judge, and appellate panels are assigned 
  
from the Trenches: A Report on the Breakout Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appel-
late Justice, 8 J App Prac & Process 141, 173 (2006) (“[W]hen an opinion is designated as ‘not for 
publication,’ the panel is permitted—and indeed often encouraged—to provide only a skeletal 
statement of the facts (perhaps not even that) and a conclusory statement of the rationale.”). 
 160 See Part I.B–C. 
 161 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837 (1984). 
 162 See Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L J 2155, 2175–76 (1998). 
 163 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideologi-
cal Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va L Rev 301, 305 (2004); 
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717, 
1718 (1997) (exploring the partisan behavior of the DC Circuit in environmental cases and con-
cluding that “a judge’s vote (not just the panel outcome) is greatly affected by the identity of the 
other judges sitting on the panel; in fact, the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel has 
a greater bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation”). 
 164 See Emerson H. Tiller and Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American 
Justice, 99 Colum L Rev 215, 234 (1999). 
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without regard to ideology.
165
 In addition, political party is only a very 
rough proxy for views in any particular case. Sometimes, even in a po-
litically mixed panel, all three judges might favor a particular outcome, 
and there may be no judge on the panel who can point out and threat-
en to expose weaknesses in the argument for that approach. 
3. Further review. 
a)  Rehearing. The only generally available mechanism in our cur-
rent system for informing a court of problems with its written opinion 
is the petition for rehearing. If the parties find an error in fact or law, 
or perceive a problem with the phrasing of the opinion, or feel that 
their arguments have not been adequately rebuffed, they may petition 
the court for rehearing. Commentators have noted that rehearing might 
be appropriate when, for instance, the parties discover an unintended 
consequence of the court’s opinion.
166
 And it is not entirely unheard of 
for courts to issue amended opinions at least partially ameliorating the 
parties’ concerns.
167
 
But the rehearing mechanism provides no opportunity for af-
fected third parties to object; only the litigating parties can petition for 
rehearing. And in any event, cases in which rehearing makes a differ-
ence are few and far between. In our legal system, rehearing simply is 
not granted except in truly extraordinary circumstances.
168
 As Samuel 
  
 165 See id at 216; Tracey E. George and Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitu-
dinal Theory and Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 Vand L Rev 1, 32 (2008) (“[M]ost 
courts have instituted procedures that result in roughly random assignment of judges to cases. 
And some courts have promulgated local rules mandating random assignment with the usual 
constraints dictated by the location of oral arguments and availability of judges.”). 
 166 See Stern, et al, Supreme Court Practice at 729 (cited in note 142) (noting that rehearing 
might be appropriate “where the unanticipated consequences of the Court’s opinion are clearly 
explained only in the rehearing petition”); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay 
Kane, 16AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 3986.1 (West 4th ed 2008) (“Matters of genuine 
public importance might also qualify [for rehearing], particularly if the judgment is calculated to 
have a direct effect on nonparties.”). 
 167 See, for example, United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1279–81 (1994) (amending 
the opinion but denying the petition for rehearing). See also Stern, et al, Supreme Court Practice 
at 729–30 (cited in note 142) (noting that the Supreme Court will sometimes “make minor 
changes in its prior opinion to correct certain inaccuracies or omissions brought to light by a 
petition for rehearing,” or will grant a motion to clarify or modify the opinion if the petitioning 
party is not seeking a change in the judgment); William F. Rylaarsdam, The Crisis of Volume in 
California’s Appellate Courts: A Reaction to Justice in the Balance 2020 and a Proposal to Reduce 
the Number of Nonmeritorious Appeals, 32 Loyola LA L Rev 63, 86 n 114 (1998) (“After the 
court files the opinion, the losing party will frequently file a petition for rehearing. Such petitions 
are rarely granted but, based on the petition, amendments to the opinion may be prepared.”).  
 168 See, for example, Stern, et al, Supreme Court Practice at 727 (cited in note 142) (noting 
that a rehearing petition in the Supreme Court following a published opinion on the merits has 
“hardly any chance of success”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 SC L 
Rev 567, 570 (1999) (“Writing a rehearing request may be good therapy for the losing lawyer, 
but such pleas are rarely granted. On rehearing petitions, responsible counsel’s best advice to the 
 
File: Abramowicz 10-6 Created on: 10/6/2009 10:13:00 PM Last Printed: 10/6/2009 10:59:00 PM 
998 The University of Chicago Law Review [76:965 
Esteicher and John Sexton have noted, “The simple truth is that, at 
present, if [an appellate] panel makes an error, there is no realistic 
chance that the error will be corrected by a motion for rehearing.”
169
 
It appears that judges become psychologically invested in their 
final opinions and are extremely resistant to making changes. To 
amend an opinion after it has become final—after the judges have 
fully committed to it in public without reservation—may appear to be 
a little too close to a public confession of ignorance or sloppiness for 
the judges’ comfort.
170
 This is likely an example of cognitive consisten-
cy bias. As Stephanie Stern explains, “Research shows that people do 
not change their minds as readily or as frequently as we would predict 
based on a ‘rational actor’ model of information processing. Rather, 
people often maintain their attitudes and beliefs in the face of explicit 
disconfirming evidence.”
171
  
This phenomenon is exacerbated when, as with judicial opinions, 
prior commitments are made public.
172
 Once they have gone on record 
with their views, judges appear to convince themselves that their ini-
tial opinion was correct, and therefore rationalize away any contrary 
  
client, much more often than not, will be: save the money.”); Marvell, Appellate Courts and Law-
yers at 84 (cited in note 20) (noting that rehearing petitions in appellate courts are “very rarely 
successful”); Robert A. Leflar, Internal Operating Procedures of Appellate Courts 60 (American Bar 
Foundation 1976) (“In many appellate courts, a motion for rehearing has come to be regarded as 
little more than a formality designed to procure delay in enforcement of the judgment.”).  
 169 Samuel Estreicher and John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s 
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 NYU L Rev 681, 810 n 582 (1984). 
 170 For courts that sit in panels, like the federal courts of appeals, it is possible that this 
concern could be ameliorated through rehearing en banc. Even when the original judges are 
unwilling to admit their mistakes, a petition for rehearing en banc allows the other judges on the 
court—who have no psychological investment in the erroneous opinion—to correct the error. 
But whatever its promise in theory, in practice, rehearing en banc, like panel rehearing, is ex-
tremely rare. See, for example, Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Pro-
posal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U Pitt L Rev 805, 831–32 (1993) 
(noting that, in 1991, rehearing en banc was granted in only 0.392 percent of cases); Estreicher 
and Sexton, 59 NYU L Rev at 810 n 582 (cited in note 169) (noting that there is “no realistic 
chance” of correcting errors through rehearing en banc). See also Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d at 1293 
(Kleinfeld dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that most appellate judges vote 
to deny rehearing en banc even when they believe that the panel decision was mistaken). Judges 
view excessive use of the en banc procedure as a threat to the collegiality of the entire court. See, 
for example, Douglas H. Ginsburg and Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981–1990, 59 Geo 
Wash L Rev 1008, 1021 (1991). 
 171 Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rule-
making, 63 U Pitt L Rev 589, 591 (2002). See also Devins and Meese, Fla St U L Rev at 332–33 
(cited in note 77) (noting that psychological “studies show that individuals will ‘anchor’ their 
views of an issue or situation on their initial assessment, even if that assessment is based upon 
less-than-perfect information,” and “once anchored, views or opinions are difficult to change, 
even if substantial information is adduced that tends to undermine the initial impression”). 
 172 See Stern, 63 U Pitt L Rev at 616–20 (cited in note 171) (noting that consistency is 
viewed positively by society, which makes it hard to change one’s mind after a commitment is 
made public). 
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evidence or argument raised in a petition for rehearing. Such evidence 
or argument might actually have led them to a different result (or at 
least a different rationale) had they been aware of it and forced to 
grapple with it at a time when their minds were still open and they 
had not yet made a final public commitment to a particular outcome.
173
  
For example, in Kennedy v Louisiana, discussed at the outset of 
this Article,
174
 the Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing, de-
spite the substantial omission in its opinion.
175
 The justices justified that 
denial by claiming that they would have reached the same decision in 
their original opinion had they been aware of the recent military law 
provision.
176
 Perhaps they would have, but neither we nor they can be 
certain of that.
177
 After all, the Court was narrowly divided 5-4, and the 
majority placed substantial weight on its assertion that only six juris-
dictions allowed the death penalty for child rape and that there was 
no significant legislative trend in the direction of wider acceptance.
178
 
The fact that rehearing is virtually never granted also limits its 
ability to serve as a legitimating and constraining mechanism. Since 
rehearing petitions are generally understood to be largely pointless and 
futile,
179
 parties do not see them as affording a genuine opportunity to 
raise concerns with the court’s opinion and to have their voices heard 
and respected. And, of course, a correcting mechanism that is virtually 
never used cannot perform a significant constraining function. 
b)  Appeals. Because issuing courts generally will not correct their 
own erroneous or ill-advised opinions, our legal system forces us to 
look to the appellate process to rectify mistakes. If the appellate 
process did so in a reliable way, then it could mitigate our informa-
tional, legitimacy, and constraint concerns: the parties (and the public 
through amicus briefs) could provide the reviewing court with infor-
mation that is necessary to correct mistakes; this opportunity could 
give parties and the public a genuine voice in the shaping of the final 
decision; and judges who knew that errors would be corrected on ap-
peal would have a powerful incentive to think carefully about every 
  
 173 See Hummels, 46 Ariz L Rev at 332 (cited in note 10) (noting that a survey of appellate 
judges and attorneys indicated that judges are more receptive to suggestions for changes in an 
opinion before a final version of the opinion has been issued).  
 174 See Introduction.  
 175 See generally Kennedy v Louisiana, 129 S Ct 1 (2008) (amending the opinion but deny-
ing the rehearing petition). 
 176 See id. 
 177 The Washington Post editorialized that the Court’s explanation of why the military law 
provision would not have made any difference was “unconvincing and leave[s]—deservedly or 
not—the impression that a majority of the court refused to allow new facts to alter their posi-
tions.” Editorial, Case Closed, Wash Post A22 (Oct 2, 2008). 
 178 See Kennedy, 128 S Ct at 2656–57.  
 179 See note 168.  
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argument and to avoid indefensible reasoning (and even if they failed 
to do so, a reviewing court could catch the error, constraining by force 
rather than incentive). But it would be a mistake to put too much faith 
in the appellate process.  
To begin with, if a court’s opinion contains a statement that will 
have adverse effects on third parties, but that does not bother the par-
ties themselves,
180
 the appellate process will be of no use. With very few 
exceptions, third parties cannot seek appellate review of a decision—
even if they have already participated as amicus curiae, and even if 
they will be significantly affected by the decision.
181
 Similarly, if the opi-
nion contains language that the prevailing party finds problematic in 
terms of its effects on future transactions, the appellate process will also 
be unavailable. A prevailing party generally may not pursue an appeal.
182
  
What is more, the appellate process cannot correct mistakes by 
high courts; when a supreme court makes an error, there is no higher 
court in which to file an appeal. And even when it is an intermediate 
appellate court that errs, the appellate process is unlikely to be of 
much use. In the modern era of discretionary jurisdiction, supreme 
courts do not consider themselves to be in the business of error cor-
rection.
183
 Thus, although they might correct a statement in an appel-
late opinion that has serious and widespread consequences for third 
parties, supreme courts will not act to correct wrongs to the parties or 
dubious statements that will affect only a narrow group.
184
  
  
 180 See Part I.B.  
 181 See Marino v Ortiz, 484 US 301, 304 (1988) (“The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or 
those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled.”); Amy E. 
Sloan, Appellate Fruit Salad and Other Concepts: A Short Course in Appellate Process, 35 U Balt 
L Rev 43, 43 & n 4, 45–46 (2005). 
 182 See Sloan, 35 U Balt L Rev at 48 (cited in note 181); Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a 
Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 Ga 
L Rev 813, 882–84 (2004):  
Black letter law says that ordinarily prevailing parties cannot appeal, that courts review 
judgments, not opinions, and consequently that prevailing parties may not appeal reasoning, 
unfavorable findings of fact, unfavorable conclusions of law, unfavorable applications of law 
to fact, or a failure of the court to rule on the grounds preferred by the would-be appellant.  
 183 See US S Ct R 10 (“A Petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted 
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of 
law.”); Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600, 613–15 (1974) (noting that state supreme courts likewise are 
often not in the business of error correction); Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of an Olympian Court: 
Common Law Judging versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 Wash & Lee L Rev 271, 
279–80 (2006) (explaining the Supreme Court’s explicit disavowal of an error correcting role). 
 184 See William H. Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Act of February 13, 
1925, 35 Yale L J 1, 2 (1925) (“The function of the Supreme Court is . . . not the remedying of a 
particular litigant’s wrong, but the consideration of cases whose decision involves principles, the 
application of which are of wide public or governmental interest, and which should be authorita-
tively declared by the final court.”).  
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In addition, as judicial dockets continue to grow, and as supreme 
courts become increasingly selective in accepting cases for review, 
high courts are with growing frequency declining to correct even er-
rors that have substantial effects on third parties. The US Supreme 
Court, for instance, now issues fewer than a quarter of the number of 
decisions on the merits that it issued a generation ago, notwithstand-
ing a dramatic increase in the output of the lower courts.
185
 The Court 
has chosen to focus its attention primarily on legal issues where there 
is a split of authority in the lower courts,
186
 rather than on issues of 
great public importance. As one Court expert has explained, in the 
absence of a conflict, the Court will hear only cases of “extraordinary 
public importance.”
187
 The Court routinely declines to review impor-
tant decisions, especially commercial law decisions that have profound 
effects on nonparties.
188
 
Finally, the appellate process is becoming increasingly less effec-
tive as a method of correcting errors even by trial courts. Chad Oldfa-
ther explains that “the emergence of ‘managerial judging’ has resulted 
in a situation in which trial judges must deeply involve themselves in 
cases in the pretrial stage, as a result of which they are able to exercise 
considerable authority in ways that are beyond the reach of appellate 
scrutiny.”
189
 In addition, “appellate courts have systematically nar-
rowed the scope of their review over a wide range of issues, leaving 
considerably greater discretion to trial courts and further diminishing 
the controls afforded by the appeal mechanism.”
190
 At least in the fed-
eral courts, the rate of reversal of trial court decisions by the courts of 
appeals has plummeted in the last half century.
191
 The appellate process 
is thus becoming less and less willing to correct trial court errors. 
  
 185 See Philip Allen Lacovara, The Incredible Shrinking Supreme Court, Am Lawyer 52, 53 
(Dec 2003). 
 186 See Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 Am Polit Sci Rev 1109, 1120 (1988) (demonstrating empirically the 
importance of the presence of a genuine conflict in the granting of certiorari). 
 187 Stephen M. Shapiro, Jr, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 24 
Litig 25, 29 (1998) (emphasis added).  
 188 See Lacovara, The Incredible Shrinking Supreme Court at 53 (cited in note 185). Interes-
tingly, one of the factors that has influenced the Court’s decisions to deny certiorari is the pres-
ence of “poor lawyering.” Shapiro, 24 Litig at 30 (cited in note 187) (“[T]he Court prefers to 
grant review in cases involving experienced counsel who can brief and argue the cases in a so-
phisticated manner.”). That suggests the appellate process does not rectify the problem of poor 
lawyering leading to poor decisions that end up binding parties who bear no responsibility for 
hiring the less competent attorneys.  
 189 Oldfather, 94 Georgetown L J at 135 (cited in note 35). 
 190 Id. 
 191 See id at 135 n 42 (noting a reversal rate of 27.9 percent in 1945, 24.5 percent in 1960, 
and 9.4 percent in 2003).  
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B. The Notice-and-Comment Mechanism 
Because existing mechanisms are inadequate to redress the serious 
concerns that we have identified, a new mechanism would be helpful. 
Our proposal is a notice-and-comment procedure, which would be rela-
tively straightforward to implement in the judicial context—whether it 
is imposed by statute, by systemwide or local court rule, or by the routine 
practice of individual judges. At base, the mechanism would look like 
this: Once the court has drafted an opinion, the court will withhold 
issuing the opinion in final form. It will instead make the opinion 
available in tentative form to the parties and the general public for 
comment (most effectively by posting it on the Internet). After a spe-
cified period of time, the court will review the comments, make any 
changes that it deems warranted, and then issue a final opinion and 
judgment. Or, if the court’s changes are sufficiently dramatic, it might 
release the revised tentative opinion for another round of comments.
192
  
This proposal is quite general and could be applied to trial, in-
termediate appellate, and supreme courts (and perhaps even to ad-
ministrative adjudication
193
); to state and federal (and perhaps even 
foreign and international) courts; and to civil and criminal cases.
194
 
Later, we will imagine variations on this mechanism, such as incorpo-
rating an enforcement scheme like hard look review or adding a filter-
ing mechanism that would highlight the most valuable comments,
195
 
but for now let us imagine a simple notice-and-comment system with-
out any adornments. 
1. Permissibility. 
An immediate question is whether it would be permissible for in-
dividual judges to voluntarily offer tentative opinions for public com-
ment, or for a court or legislature to institute a notice-and-comment 
approach systematically. We see no serious bar. Some courts and 
judges already release tentative opinions to the parties prior to oral 
argument.
196
 The public, of course, has a First Amendment right to 
comment on any such materials released, and there have even been 
  
 192 In administrative law, renoticing is required when a rule is not a “logical outgrowth” of the 
original notice. See, for example, United Steelworkers v Marshall, 647 F2d 1189, 1221 (DC Cir 1980). 
 193 See note 213.  
 194 We recognize, though, that the benefits and costs of notice and comment might vary 
across contexts. It might be argued, for example, that this procedure would be more useful in 
intermediate appellate courts than in supreme courts (which have fewer cases to consider and 
thus may make fewer errors) or trial courts (whose opinions generally lack precedential value). 
 195 See Part III.B–C. 
 196 See notes 10–11 and accompanying text.  
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reports of judges amending opinions in response to public criticism.
197
 
While the Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits a judge from 
“mak[ing] any public statement that might reasonably be expected to 
affect [a case’s] outcome or impair [its] fairness,” the rule explicitly 
notes that a “judge may make public statements in the course of official 
duties.”
198
 Release of a tentative opinion should be no more trouble-
some than an explanation by a judge in oral argument about the 
judge’s tentative view of a particular question of law.
199
 
It also seems reasonably clear that posting tentative opinions for 
public comment would not violate Article III’s injunction against ad-
visory opinions by the federal courts, even though the opinion is, at 
least temporarily, not binding. Since the tentative opinion is released 
during the pendency of a genuine case or controversy, it is not advi-
sory.
200
 The more difficult question is what happens if the case becomes 
  
 197 See, for example, Howard Wasserman, Someone is Reading the Blogs, Concurring 
Opinions Blog, (Oct 14, 2008), online at 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/10/someone_is_read.html (visited Sept 1, 
2009) (noting an email from Ninth Circuit Judge Raymond Fisher reporting that he had revised 
his opinion in an antitrust case in response to a blog post). 
 198 Rule 2.10: Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases, ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct Canon 24–25 (2007).  
 199 See note 141 and accompanying text. 
 200 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 58 (Aspen 3d ed 
2006) (explaining that an opinion is not advisory if (1) it is issued in the course of an actual case 
or controversy, and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that a favorable ultimate decision in that 
case or controversy will have some effect on the parties). It is sometimes said that advisory opi-
nions are “opinions that are not in support of a judgment resolving a case or controversy before 
the court.” Sullivan, 43 Houston L Rev at 1164 (cited in note 47). On that definition, a tentative 
opinion might indeed be advisory, since it would not (yet) be accompanied by a judgment resolv-
ing the case or controversy. But that definition seems clearly overbroad, as it would render all 
interlocutory opinions advisory; many opinions are issued during the course of a case or contro-
versy that do not purport to be dispositive of it and that are not accompanied by a judgment, 
such as opinions resolving discovery disputes or denying summary judgment. It is sometimes also 
said that an advisory opinion is “a nonbinding statement by a court of its interpretation of the 
law on a matter submitted for that purpose.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1125 (West 8th ed 2004). 
This too raises concerns for tentative opinions, since they would be “nonbinding” until formally 
issued (either as is or with changes) at the close of the comment period. But to the extent that 
this definition implies that any nonbinding legal interpretation is advisory, it also seems clearly 
overbroad. If every nonbinding opinion is advisory, then a district judge acts unconstitutionally 
every time she tells the parties that she is inclined to rule one way or the other in an effort to get 
them to resolve an ancillary issue or to allow them to convince the judge otherwise. See, for 
example, Jon Heller, Excerpts from the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans Pur-
suant to the Civil Justice Reform Act, Q214 ALI-ABA 515, 574 (1993) (noting that the Eastern 
District of California enacted a “[p]re-argument notification program to advise parties of areas on 
which [a] judge would like oral argument to focus, or allow [a] judge to issue tentative ruling or take 
matter under submission”). Indeed, if this definition is correct, then decisions on motions in limine 
are unconstitutional. Consider, for example, Luce v United States, 469 US 38, 41–42 (1984):  
The ruling is subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony 
differs from what was contained in the defendant’s proffer. Indeed even if nothing unex-
 
File: Abramowicz 10-6 Created on: 10/6/2009 10:13:00 PM Last Printed: 10/6/2009 10:59:00 PM 
1004 The University of Chicago Law Review [76:965 
moot during the comment period—after the release of the tentative 
opinion, but before the release of the final opinion. Would it be consti-
tutional for the court to go ahead and release a final opinion at the 
close of the comment period after the case is moot? 
Of course, the court could simply withdraw the tentative opinion 
and decline to issue a final opinion. That would obviate concerns 
about advisory opinions, but the constitutional peace of mind would 
likely come at too steep a price. If the parties could settle the case dur-
ing the comment period and thereby prevent the issuance of a binding 
precedent, there would be an incentive for the party that is on the los-
ing end of the tentative opinion to do so, especially if it is a repeat 
player. Corporate defendants and interest groups, for instance, might 
be willing to pay a victorious plaintiff a premium—above what the 
plaintiff would receive under the tentative opinion—in order to keep 
the precedent off the books.
201
  
The courts have already faced a variant of this problem. In the 
1980s and early 1990s, the federal courts began to see an explosion of 
cases that settled during the pendency of a petition for rehearing or 
certiorari, or during the pendency of an appeal, with a stipulation that 
the prior opinion in the case be vacated.
202
 These settlements were of-
ten the result of strategic decisions by repeat players and interest 
groups seeking to eradicate unfavorable precedents.
203
 In 1994, the Su-
preme Court put an end to the practice of vacating opinions after set-
tlement in a sternly phrased opinion that insisted that vacatur was 
inconsistent with “the public interest.”
204
 The Court explained that 
“[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the 
legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of pri-
vate litigants.”
205
 Allowing vacatur “would—quite apart from any con-
  
pected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, 
to alter a previous in limine ruling.  
 201 In Piscataway v Taxman, 522 US 1010 (1997), civil rights groups that feared an adverse 
affirmative action precedent paid a premium to the plaintiff in order to settle the case prior to 
oral argument in the Supreme Court. See Lisa Estrada, Buying the Status Quo on Affirmative 
Action: The Piscataway Settlement and Its Lessons about Interest Group Path Manipulation, 9 
Geo Mason U Civ Rts L J 207, 215–16 (1999) (discussing the unusual dismissal of the Piscataway 
case just weeks before the Supreme Court oral argument). That phenomenon is relatively rare, 
due to the difficulty of predicting how courts will rule ex ante. But once a tentative opinion 
issues, the writing on the wall is suddenly much more legible. 
 202 See Judith Resnick, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and 
the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L Rev 1471, 1472 (1994).  
 203 See Sullivan, 43 Houston L Rev at 1174–75 (cited in note 47); Howard Slavitt, Selling the 
Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 Harv 
CR–CL L Rev 109, 118–19, 137–38 (1995); Resnick, 41 UCLA L Rev at 1488–89 (cited in 200). 
 204 See US Bancorp Mortgage Co v Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 US 18, 26 (1994). 
 205 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
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siderations of fairness to the parties—disturb the orderly operation of 
the federal judicial system.”
206
  
Similarly, allowing the parties to avoid the making of precedent 
by settling during the comment period would undermine the public 
interest and the orderly lawmaking function of the courts, and would 
open the system of judicial lawmaking to abuse by private parties. For 
notice-and-comment procedures to be viable, then, there must be a way 
for the opinion to issue even if the case settles during the comment pe-
riod, so as to eliminate the incentive for manipulative settlement.  
One possibility would be to treat a tentative opinion as a pub-
lished opinion of the court at the moment that it is issued, but subject 
to revision at the end of the comment period. That would preclude 
settling during the comment period to avoid making precedent, since 
the precedent has already been made, and it would not present any 
advisory opinion problems, since the opinion is binding the moment it 
is issued during a live case or controversy. In effect, the court would be 
issuing an opinion and inviting comments on the possibility of rehear-
ing. A drawback, however, is that once an opinion has binding effect 
on the public, it may be disruptive to change it, and judges may be less 
willing to do so. Nonetheless, a judge who voluntarily seeks comments 
from the public might take this approach. 
A better long-term solution would be for a rule implementing a 
systemic notice-and-comment procedure to provide that tentative 
opinions do not go into effect right away, but are automatically treated 
as final at the end of the comment period if not withdrawn or super-
seded by a separate final opinion. That way, if the case settles during 
the comment period, the court has two options. If it realizes from the 
public comments that there are problems with the tentative opinion, 
the court can withdraw it. (Amending the opinion would seem to be 
out of the question, as the case would now be moot, and the court 
would no longer have jurisdiction to take substantive actions.
207
) But if 
the court is happy with the tentative opinion, it simply does nothing, 
and the opinion will automatically become final. Because the court 
would be taking no action after the case became moot, it is hard to see 
any constitutional problem.
208
 
  
 206 Id at 27. See also Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co v Yanakas, 11 F3d 381, 384 (2d Cir 
1993) (refusing to “allow a party with a deep pocket to eliminate an unreviewable precedent it 
dislikes simply by agreeing to a sufficiently lucrative settlement to obtain its adversary’s cooper-
ation in a motion to vacate” because that would not be “a proper use of the judicial system”). 
 207 See Friends of the Earth, Inc v Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc, 528 US 167, 
192 (2000) (noting that courts have no license “to retain jurisdiction over cases in which one or 
both of the parties plainly lack a continuing interest, as when the parties have settled”). 
 208 In Bonner Mall, the Supreme Court explained that, if a case becomes moot, the “Court 
may not consider its merits, but may make such disposition of the whole case as justice may 
 
File: Abramowicz 10-6 Created on: 10/6/2009 10:13:00 PM Last Printed: 10/6/2009 10:59:00 PM 
1006 The University of Chicago Law Review [76:965 
2. Benefits. 
What value would this notice-and-comment procedure add? In ad-
ministrative law, it is generally understood that the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedure serves a variety of goals. Most important among 
them, at least for our purposes, are the following: (1) it allows the public 
to bring to the attention of the decisionmaker relevant information that 
otherwise may not have been considered;
209
 (2) it affords the opportunity 
for public participation, which helps to legitimate the unelected adminis-
trative state;
210
 and (3) “the very rigor of the procedural process may in-
sure substantive results, because actions taken in opposition to choices 
suggested by publicly produced information could be construed as arbi-
trary and capricious.”
211
  
  
require,” 513 US at 21, quoting Walling V. James v Reuter, Inc, 321 US 671, 677 (1944), and may 
“enter orders necessary and appropriate to final disposition” of the case, Bonner Mall, 513 US at 
22. Bonner Mall stands for the proposition that, when settlement moots a case, justice requires 
that the parties not be able to avoid the precedential effects of a judicial opinion—even if the 
mandate has not yet issued and the opinion has not yet been given the force of law at the time of 
settlement. See id at 26–29. Simply allowing the tentative opinion to become final serves the 
interest of justice, and it does not require the issuance of an order or the taking of any affirma-
tive step at all after the case becomes moot.  
 209 See, for example, Dismas Charities, Inc v DOJ, 401 F3d 666, 680 (6th Cir 2005) (noting 
“the primary purpose of Congress in imposing notice-and-comment requirements for rulemak-
ing—to get public input so as to get the wisest rules”); Michael Asimow, Public Participation in 
the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 Mich L Rev 520, 574 (1997) (“The 
primary reason that public participation leads to better rules is that it provides a channel through 
which the agency can receive needed education. Agencies are not omniscient and do not have all 
relevant economic and social data.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rule-
making, 47 Admin L Rev 59, 86 (1995) (asserting that the primary benefit of notice-and-
comment rulemaking lies in the fact that “[a]gencies are more likely to make wise and well-
informed policy decisions if they solicit, receive, and consider data and views from all citizens 
who are likely to be affected by a policy decision”); Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy 
Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the 
Public?, 41 Duke L J 1311, 1373 (1992) (“The accuracy and thoroughness of an agency’s actions 
are enhanced by the requirement that it invite and consider the comments of all the world, in-
cluding those of directly affected persons who are able, often uniquely, to supply pertinent in-
formation and analysis.”). 
 210 See, for example, Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing 
Public Participation and Access to Government Information through the Internet, 50 Admin L 
Rev 277, 289 (1998) (“Public participation is essential to sound agency decisionmaking because 
. . . it instills a sense of legitimacy in the public for the agency’s decisions.”); Jim Rossi, Participa-
tion Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw 
U L Rev 173, 187 (1997) (“Persons and entities subject to agency regulations are more likely to 
view agency decisions as legitimate if the procedures leading to their formulation provide for fair 
consideration of their views.”). 
 211 Victor B. Flatt, Notice and Comment for Nonprofit Organizations, 55 Rutgers L Rev 65, 
73 (2002). See also Rossi, 92 Nw U L Rev at 183 (cited in note 210); Alan B. Morrison, The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 Va L Rev 253, 263 (1986) (arguing 
that “public participation,” including notice-and-comment rulemaking, “has deterred the agen-
cies from straying too far from their assigned missions”). 
File: Abramowicz 10-6 Created on: 10/6/2009 10:13:00 PM Last Printed: 10/6/2009 10:59:00 PM 
2009] Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking 1007 
That is to say, notice-and-comment procedures serve informa-
tional, legitimating, and constraining functions—the very functions 
that we have endeavored to show are not always well performed by 
existing mechanisms in our judicial system.
212
 This Part addresses the 
possibilities and limits of employing notice-and-comment procedures 
to fulfill each of those functions in the judicial context.
213
 It also ex-
plains why notice and comment is likely to be superior in each respect 
to a regime, like that in some California and Arizona courts,
214
 in which 
tentative opinions are released to the parties before oral argument. 
a)  The informational function. We begin with the informational 
function—the effort to ensure that the court is fully informed of the 
relevant facts, legal authorities, and potential consequences of its deci-
sion, and that it is made aware of errors in its reasoning, understand-
ing, or analysis. Notice and comment has significant potential to fill in 
the informational gaps identified above. It allows the parties to inform 
the court of mistakes or omissions in its opinion—after the opinion 
has been written, but before it is issued in final form. If the court mis-
construes facts on which the parties had not focused, or decides issues 
that the parties had not briefed, or relies on authorities that the par-
ties had not confronted, notice and comment gives the parties the 
meaningful opportunity that they currently lack to review the opinion 
carefully, to raise objections, and to steer the court in the right direction. 
Notice and comment’s use of a written, rather than oral, exchange 
to achieve this goal provides it a significant advantage over simply 
providing a copy of the court’s tentative opinion to the parties prior to 
  
 212 See Parts I and II.A. 
 213 Administrative law distinguishes between two fundamental categories of agency action: 
adjudication and rulemaking. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Terminology and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 48 Mich L Rev 57, 65 (1949). Generally speaking, rulemaking involves 
the establishment of norms of general applicability and future effect, whereas adjudication re-
solves the specific rights of individuals in special circumstances. See Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judi-
cial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric 
Utility Industry, 1994 Wis L Rev 763, 769–70. Notice-and-comment procedures are generally 
employed for rulemaking, but not for adjudication. Compare 5 USC § 553 (rulemaking), with 
5 USC § 554 (adjudication). The distinction between rulemaking and adjudication in the agency 
arena is not always a clear one, however. See David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or 
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 Harv L Rev 921, 924 (1965). In 
reality, agency adjudications often have precedential value and establish generally applicable 
policy. See Rossi, 1994 Wis L Rev at 770–74. Our general proposal for notice and comment in the 
courts could thus sensibly be applied to agency adjudication as well. Consider id at 772 (arguing 
that “most administrative law commentators” have a “strong preference” for rulemaking over 
adjudication because of the informational and legitimating benefits of notice and comment, and 
lamenting that the courts do not force the agencies to make law only by rulemaking). Because 
we do not recommend applying hard look review in the context of adjudication, the agency’s 
choice between adjudication and rulemaking would still affect the cumbersomeness of the no-
tice-and-comment process. 
 214 See notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
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oral argument. In the educational literature, there is some controversy 
over whether, in general, individuals learn better by reading than by 
listening to the same passage.
215
 But in the context of judicial argu-
ment, it seems clear that the verbal presentation to a judge of a coun-
terargument will rarely be as clear as an edited written presentation 
could be. Anyone who casually reads oral argument transcripts will 
recall passages in which either the judges’ questions or the parties’ 
responses are, on close examination, incomprehensible. It is true that 
oral argument allows for some back and forth, but we suspect that a 
deliberate review of a carefully crafted written comment will generally 
convey better information than verbal processing of off-the-cuff 
statements at oral argument.
216
 Indeed, at oral argument, judges often 
cut off lawyers before they are able to offer a complete answer or to 
fully articulate a thought.
217
  
There is a further substantial informational advantage of notice 
and comment over circulating tentative opinions to the parties before 
argument. Notice and comment allows nonparties who could be af-
fected by the opinion to call information or unanticipated consequences 
to the court’s attention: to inform the judges of how the opinion might 
have a negative impact in other situations; to help the judges to reph-
rase overly broad or vague statements and avoid unnecessary and po-
tentially harmful dicta; to challenge weakly supported scientific, or 
other, conclusions;
218
 and the like. Under a notice-and-comment sys-
tem, interest groups and other organizations could peruse tentative 
opinions to look for language that might be problematic to them. They 
might even set up automatic searches of online databases to flag tenta-
tive opinions that might be of interest. Law professors and lawyers 
  
 215 See, for example, Robert Q. Young, A Comparison of Reading and Listening Compre-
hension with Rate of Presentation Controlled, 21 AV Comm Rev 327, 334–35 (1973) (concluding 
that most subjects learn equally well from reading and hearing material, if the same amount of 
time is spent in learning). 
 216 See notes 143–47 and accompanying text. But see Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J. Meador, and 
Maurice Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal 17 (West 1976) (“Some judges assimilate ideas more readily by 
oral than by written transmission; and some ideas are more readily transmitted by oral means.”). 
 217 See Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U Pa L 
Rev 1421, 1439–40 (2006); Philippa Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Con-
versations with Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 34 U Rich L Rev 285, 298 (2000) (quoting Justice 
Harry Blackmun) (observing that oral argument “sharpens the focus of the case if we let the 
lawyers do that and don’t interrupt them with constant questions. . . . It’s hard to get everything 
out in thirty minutes, especially if Justices interrupt.”). 
 218 Some have argued that amicus briefs may promote junk science because they are not 
subject to rigorous evidentiary requirements or peer review. See, for example, Simard, 27 Rev 
Litig at 704 (cited in note 112); Garcia, 35 Fla St U L Rev at 352 (cited in note 115); Michael 
Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in 
Amicus Briefs, 72 NC L Rev 91, 94 (1993). That same risk might be posed by a notice-and-
comment system, but this system at least allows responses and dialogue, so third parties could 
point out problems in social science and arguments raised by others. 
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could identify and discuss important tentative opinions at conferences 
and through online discussions. Bar association sections could circulate 
potentially important tentative opinions to their members. The Solicitor 
General’s office could systematically review tentative opinions to see 
whether the federal government has an interest in commenting.
219
 And 
so on. In short, notice and comment would fill a glaring hole in our legal 
system by affording the entire public a cost-effective opportunity to 
provide timely and targeted information to the court addressing the 
exact issues and language contemplated by the judges. 
b)  The legitimating function. Notice and comment could also help 
to legitimate the judicial system in the eyes of both the parties and the 
public. As noted above, studies have shown that the public’s percep-
tion of the legitimacy of judicial decisions turns on whether affected 
parties have an adequate opportunity to participate in the proceed-
ing
220
 and whether the public believes that the court “gets the kind of 
information it needs to make informed decisions.”
221
 Notice and com-
ment would plug informational gaps in our current system and make 
sure that the parties have a meaningful opportunity to address the 
actual reasoning and authorities harnessed by the court, even if the 
court pulled them out of the blue. And it would allow anyone who 
might be affected by the court’s opinion to raise timely and meaning-
ful objections at a comparatively low cost. In addition, studies have 
shown that public perceptions of judicial legitimacy also turn in part 
on whether those who are affected feel that they have an adequate 
opportunity to correct errors made by the court.
222
 Here again, notice 
and comment could have a substantial legitimating effect.  
By comparison, a practice of sending tentative opinions to the 
parties before oral argument would contribute considerably less to 
legitimacy, because it does not allow third parties to participate at all 
and it allows parties to respond only at oral argument, where they are 
often unable to best articulate their concerns. In addition, courts that 
have adopted the pre-argument tentative opinion model have often 
made substantial changes to the tentative opinion after oral argument, 
sometimes discarding it altogether and starting over.
223
 As a result, in 
  
 219 Consider 28 CFR § 0.20(b)–(c) (noting that the Solicitor General must authorize all 
appeals and all amicus briefs filed by the government).  
 220 See notes 96–101and accompanying text. 
 221 Tyler, 56 DePaul L Rev at 680–682, 681 n 126 (cited in note 94). 
 222 See Tyler, Why People Obey the Law at 137 (cited in note 97). 
 223 See Hummels, 46 Ariz L Rev at 331 (cited in note 10); id at 349 (noting that, in 2002, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, changed the result after oral argument in 11.7 percent 
of cases and made substantial modifications in another 26 percent of cases); Hollenhorst, 36 
Santa Clara L Rev at 34–35 (cited in note 10) (noting that, over an eight-month period, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, changed the result after oral 
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many cases, the court ends up issuing an opinion that the parties never 
had an opportunity to address. With a notice-and-comment system, if 
the court substantially rewrites the opinion, it can post the new draft 
for additional comments before issuing a final decision.
224
  
Notice and comment may appear particularly central to the legi-
timacy of federal administrative agencies because of the uneasy place 
of administrative agencies in the constitutional structure. The Consti-
tution does not clearly support the existence of an administrative 
state,
225
 and “we might think that the [Supreme] Court sees administra-
tive law as helping to reconcile the administrative state with the con-
stitutional structure, and in this sense, as helping to promote the legi-
timacy of agency action.”
226
 A leading political science theory suggests 
that administrative procedures promote congressional control over 
administrative agencies.
227
 At least when they engage in statutory in-
terpretation, however, courts can also be seen as unelected agents of 
the legislature. Just as notice and comment can help alert Congress to 
instances of unfaithful agency by administrative bodies, so too can it 
perform this function for the courts.  
Indeed, there are at least two respects in which notice and com-
ment may be more useful in the service of legitimacy in the judicial 
context than the administrative one. First, agency decisions are subject 
to judicial review, and so there is already some check on administra-
tive authority. Although a legislature sometimes overrides a final, 
nonconstitutional judicial decision,
228
 judicial decisions are not syste-
matically subject to review from another branch of government. Thus, 
public participation may be even more necessary to legitimacy. Second, 
one complaint about the administrative notice-and-comment process is 
  
argument in 3.5 percent of cases, substantially rewrote the opinion in 7.9 percent of cases, and 
made major changes in nearly 20 percent of cases); id at 331 n 108 (“On a number of occasions, 
this court has rewritten entire opinions after oral argument.”). 
 224 See note 192 and accompanying text. 
 225 See Gary Lawson, Prolegomenon to Any Future Administrative Law Course: Separation 
of Powers and the Transcendental Deduction, 49 SLU L J 885, 888 (2005) (arguing that “virtually 
the entire structure of the modern administrative state is either suspect or flagrantly unconstitu-
tional under any plausible formalist account”). 
 226 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum L Rev 
1749, 1805 (2007). See also Bressman, 78 NYU L Rev at 546–47 (cited in note 103) (arguing that 
allowing agencies to develop policies through interpretive rules rather than rules subject to 
notice-and-comment procedures “jeopardizes administrative legitimacy”). 
 227 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Pro-
cedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J L, Econ, & Org 243, 244 (1987). 
 228 See Pablo T. Spiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court 
Decisions, 16 Intl Rev L & Econ 503, 503–04 (1996) (providing a positive political theory account 
of legislative overrulings). 
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that, because private interest groups author many comments,
229
 the 
process may foster private capture of administrative agencies.
230
 Some 
critics have argued that courts too are subject to capture, for example 
by business interests,
231
 but the conventional wisdom is that courts are 
significantly less subject to capture than are agencies.
232
 
c)  The constraining function. The legitimacy of a governmental 
process may also be a product of the degree to which it constrains the 
government from acting arbitrarily.
233
 In the administrative law con-
text, one aim of the notice-and-comment system is to constrain agency 
officials: to prevent them from acting arbitrarily or in a manner incon-
sistent with the law or the public interest.
234
  
That aim could also be served in the judicial context. A notice-
and-comment regime, providing an opportunity for the public and the 
litigants both to highlight arguments to which a court appears poised 
to give short shrift and to point out flaws in the opinion, would streng-
then the judicial opinion as a tool of constraint. As one judge has put 
it, “You can’t stand there as somebody is taking the opinion apart, and 
rightly so, and then send out the same opinion. If the criticism is valid, 
it forces us to address it.”
235
 A notice-and-comment requirement can 
force or at least encourage a judge to confront more directly over-
looked arguments or weaknesses in the opinion.
236
  
  
 229 See David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index 
Rulemaking, 74 Fordham L Rev 81, 85 (2005). 
 230 See, for example, Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 Am U J Gender Socy 
Policy & L 381, 387–400 (2002). 
 231 See Donald J. Burnett, Jr, A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault upon Impartiality of 
State Courts and the Challenge to Judicial Selection, 34 Fordham Urban L J 265, 273–76 (2007). 
 232 This conclusion flows in significant part from the facts that agencies usually have a 
somewhat narrow focus; that agency officials often come from, and plan to return to, the industry 
that they regulate; and that powerful interest groups can help to provide agency members with 
benefits that they prize (budgetary clout on Capitol Hill and future employment are the two 
most often cited). By contrast, judges have life tenure and thus less concern about their future 
employment, have salaries and budgets that are largely free from congressional meddling, and 
may have a greater desire for prestige (which powerful interest groups cannot easily provide). 
See Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System 
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 Georgetown L J 269, 311–12 (2007). See also Robert D. 
Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 Pub Choice 107, 129 (1983) (arguing that 
judges are generally less subject to capture because they seek to maximize their prestige). 
 233 See note 103 and accompanying text. 
 234 See note 211 and accompanying text. The existence of the “hard look” enforcement 
mechanism makes clear that constraint is one of the goals of notice and comment in administra-
tive law. See notes 288–92 and accompanying text. 
 235 Hummels, 46 Ariz L Rev at 337 (cited in note 10) (quoting Justice Thomas E. Hollen-
horst) (discussing pre-argument tentative opinions in California). 
 236 “Placing the draft opinion ‘face up’ on the table promotes accountability by making it 
harder for judges to remain intransigent in the face of persuasive arguments.” Id at 347. 
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This consideration seems at least slightly stronger in the judicial 
context than in the administrative one. In both contexts, the person 
making the decision does not bear the full burden of the notice-and-
comment process. Law clerks and administrative agency employees 
handle most of the work. Presumably, though, they will sometimes ask 
their bosses for their views on how to address the most compelling 
comments. That seems especially likely in a judicial chambers, where 
the relative flatness of the employment hierarchy and the traditional 
norms of in-chambers behavior
237
 increase the chance that analytical 
problems will be brought to the judge’s attention. 
Anticipation of a notice-and-comment process can also improve 
work effort before the notice-and-comment period even begins. In the 
agency context, an employee (or group of employees) tasked with 
drafting a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
238
 may be embarrassed 
should substantial flaws in the Notice be identified. As such, she has a 
powerful incentive to eliminate or avoid those flaws before making 
the Notice public. This effect also may be somewhat stronger in the 
judicial context. Unlike an agency rule, a judicial opinion generally 
lists a sole judge as the opinion author, concentrating accountability 
for any superficial reasoning.
239
 Similarly, when a judge delegates work 
to a law clerk, even though that clerk will be anonymous, the clerk 
might be embarrassed if commenters pointed out that he had inade-
quately responded to an argument made in the briefs or had otherwise 
mishandled an issue. Of course, even without notice and comment, 
judges and law clerks have an incentive to work carefully in order to 
avoid subsequent, embarrassing criticism of their opinions. But the 
fact that the criticism will be coming soon, in a systematic, public 
manner that is easy for all to discover, and from those who best under-
stand the facts of the case and the controlling legal authorities, makes 
notice and comment a better motivator. That is especially so for those 
law clerks who would be forced to explain a mistake to their judges 
while still serving in their employ, and for those judges on multi-
member courts who would be forced to explain a mistake to the other 
  
 237 See, for example, Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 263 (cited in note 140) (noting that, 
when law clerks encounter problems in the drafting of opinions, they bring those problems to the 
attention of the judge); Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers at 87–97 (cited in note 20) (dis-
cussing the relationship between clerks and judges and noting the extent to which clerks seek to 
bring the best information to the attention of their judges so as to facilitate informed decisions 
by the judges on all important matters). 
 238 See 5 USC § 553(b) (requiring a “notice of proposed rule making,” which must include “either 
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved”). 
 239 Consider Hollenhorst, 36 Santa Clara L Rev at 13 (cited in note 10) (defending pre-
argument tentative opinions on the ground that “the visibility of the draft opinion increases 
judicial vigilance” because the judge “may suffer embarrassment” if an error is pointed out). 
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panel members (who would also suffer embarrassment at having 
signed on to the opinion without catching the mistake).  
Both the anticipation of a notice-and-comment period and the 
publication of comments may temper not only merely idiosyncratic or 
sloppy, but also ideological, decisionmaking, a problem present in the 
administrative context as well. It has long been clear that the Progres-
sive Era vision
240
 of an executive branch driven by disinterested scien-
tific inquiry was, at least, incomplete.
241
 This view failed to take suffi-
ciently into account that those of different political persuasions might 
view policy issues differently, either because partisans fail to share 
goals or because they disagree on which means are most likely to 
achieve specific goals.  
The recognition of politics’ role, however, can provoke opposite 
reactions to the utility of notice-and-comment proceedings. In the 
administrative context, some argue that administrative law should 
tolerate ideological decisionmaking, while others insist on rigorous 
review of decisions to limit political influence. A seminal case on the 
hard look doctrine, Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co,
242
 is illustrative.
243
 In a separate 
opinion, then-Justice William Rehnquist observed that the agency had 
changed positions as a result of a change in political leadership with 
the entrance of the Reagan administration.
244
 For Rehnquist, that 
should have been an acceptable basis for the agency’s decision.
245
 On 
this view, the notice-and-comment process can be a charade, a pur-
ported exercise in objective analysis that seeks to mask inevitably po-
litical choices.
246
 It will often be possible to develop adequate justifica-
  
 240 See, for example, Marshall J. Breger and Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory 
and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin L Rev 1111, 1131–32 (2000) (discussing the 
Progressive emphasis on apolitical, independent regulatory commissions staffed by experts). 
 241 See, for example, Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 Cal L 
Rev 919, 925 (1989) (“The views of Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive era theorists and James 
Landis and the New Dealers seem anachronistic in light of modern public law theories that view 
administrative agency decisionmaking as a complex amalgam of rational calculation, statutory 
interpretation, political judgment, and translation of values into public policy.”).  
 242 463 US 29 (1983).  
 243 Id at 34 (holding that “the agency failed to present an adequate basis and explanation 
for rescinding the passive restraint requirement” for cars). 
 244 See id at 59 (Rehnquist concurring) (“The agency’s changed view of the standard seems 
to be related to the election of a new President of a different political party.”). 
 245 See id (“A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a 
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its 
programs and regulations.”). 
 246 See, for example, Christopher F. Edley, Jr, Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Con-
trol of Bureaucracy 184 (Yale 1990) (characterizing Rehnquist’s observation as being “that the 
boundaries among politics, science, and fairness are virtually unobservable in practice because 
any complicated problem will involve the integration of all three decision making paradigms; the 
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tions for a wide range of potential approaches to an issue, and so no-
tice-and-comment requirements may serve to increase expense with-
out eliminating ideology. 
Rehnquist’s approach, however, failed to command a majority of 
the Court, either at the time or in subsequent cases.
247
 Defenders of the 
hard look doctrine do not claim that the doctrine will stamp out ideo-
logical influence. To the contrary, the hard look doctrine is supposed 
to be somewhat deferential.
248
 But decisions must be justified on plaus-
ible, publicly acceptable grounds. This may place some decisions effec-
tively out of bounds. For example, if the true motive behind a poten-
tial regulatory change is to satisfy a politically powerful interest group, 
and there is no public-spirited defense of the change, the notice-and-
comment requirement might lead an agency not to pursue the change. 
Or if the agency does proceed with the initial proposal, a judge might 
use the hard look doctrine to reject the decision as too extreme.
249
 
To the extent that moderating extreme decisionmaking is a legi-
timate goal of the notice-and-comment process, it is at least as salient 
in the judicial context as in the administrative one. Ideological deci-
sionmaking by the executive branch may be considered undesirable in 
part because the legislature is viewed as the supreme policymaker.
250
 
But, as a matter of public choice theory, the superiority of the legisla-
ture as a political branch is contested, and some administrative law 
scholars insist that the political accountability of the president makes 
the executive branch a more effective locus of policymaking than the 
  
administrator cannot avoid deploying subjective preferences, even while making a putatively 
‘scientific’ decision”). 
 247 The Court did come around to the view that it must respect executive branch policy 
choices. See Chevron, 467 US at 866 (“[F]ederal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty 
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”). But the Court still expects detailed 
justifications of such choices. See id. 
 248 The hard look doctrine may have been instituted in reaction to a period of more defe-
rential review. See, for example, Matthew Warren, Note, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and 
the Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 Georgetown L J 2599, 2603 
(2002) (noting that concerns about agency capture in the 1960s and 1970s likely led to closer 
examination of administrative behavior). But the courts have emphasized that they ought not 
substitute their policy views for an agency’s. See State Farm, 463 US at 43 (“The scope of review 
under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency.”). 
 249 See, for example, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Standard of Review for Rescission of 
Agency Rule, 97 Harv L Rev 230, 237 n 54 (1983) (suggesting that although the majority in State 
Farm “scrupulously avoided mention of the political overtones of [the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration’s] actions, it may well have been reacting against them”). 
 250 That is, policy judgments actually made by Congress, if found to be constitutional, are 
generally considered to be controlling. See, for example, Edward O. Correia, A Legislative Con-
ception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 Case W Res L Rev 1129, 1142 (1992) (“[F]ew scholars and 
virtually no court opinion ever claims (openly) to favor violating legislative supremacy.”).  
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legislature.
251
 By contrast, there are fewer defenders of the courts as 
supreme policymakers. While Hamilton’s famous admonition that the 
courts render “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment”
252
 may be 
viewed as naïve pre-realism, there is widespread support for the propo-
sition that, at least at the subconstitutional level, the courts should not 
engage in general policymaking that defies the will of the legislature.  
Perhaps one explanation is that, in the lower courts, judges are 
randomly selected; the ideology of any particular judge or panel will 
be largely a matter of chance.
253
 As such, observers cannot necessarily 
attribute a particular judicial decision to a recent presidential election, 
as they might to explain executive branch policymaking. Another rea-
son is that courts are politically insulated. The defense of agency poli-
cymaking on accountability grounds cannot be easily marshaled on 
behalf of judicial decisionmaking. The independence of the judiciary 
may be particularly well suited to the tasks of interpretation and rights 
protection, but not to policymaking.  
It is difficult to gauge just how effective notice and comment 
would be as a constraining device. This depends on myriad factors, 
such as how useful third party submissions are, how much time judges 
devote to reading and considering comments, and how embarrassed 
judges would be if they ignored a comment that pointed out a signifi-
cant flaw in reasoning. We have seen, however, that there is at least 
some empirical support for the proposition that judges are less likely 
to act ideologically when weaknesses in their arguments are relatively 
likely to be exposed.
254
 If Cross and Tiller are correct in attributing 
their result to the anticipated effect of whistleblowing, then a notice-
and-comment process could be helpful, serving a role similar to panel 
diversity. Anticipation of whistleblowing by the public may lead some 
judges to moderate their opinions, at least if there is an expectation 
that comments will receive significant attention.  
It might be argued, however, that by the time judges issue a tenta-
tive opinion that they open to public comment, they are so cognitively 
committed to it that they will latch onto any imaginable strategy for 
defending their original arguments, which in turn suggests that the 
  
 251 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Deci-
sions, 1 J L, Econ, & Org 81, 95–97 (1985). 
 252 Federalist 78 (Hamilton) at 523 (cited in note 91). 
 253 Some commentators have proposed instituting affirmative efforts to ensure ideological 
balance on a panel. See, for example, Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 
57 NYU Ann Surv Am L 291, 304, 310 (2000) (criticizing random selection of panels and promot-
ing balance based on party preferences for judges); Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum L Rev at 215 
(cited in note 164) (advocating every panel have judges from both political parties as determined 
by the appointing president). 
 254 See Part II.A.2.c.  
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public comments would come too late to have a genuine constraining 
effect. Indeed, Stern has argued that in the administrative agency con-
text, notice-and-comment decisionmaking may be counterproductive, 
“by encouraging agency ‘lock-in,’ or suboptimal change, through pre-
mature commitment to a proposal.”
255
 In the judicial context, however, 
notice and comment could not possibly increase lock-in relative to our 
current system. Under our proposal, judges would not stake out a ten-
tative position until the point at which, under our current system, they 
stake out their final position. And it is likely that notice and comment 
would in fact decrease lock-in relative to the current system, in which 
judges are virtually deaf to arguments in rehearing petitions that they 
have made a mistake.
256
  
In most contexts, including the administrative one, making a change 
in response to a comment carries a connotation of embarrassment—an 
admission of error. Stern explains that “[s]ocial pressures play an impor-
tant role in the consistency-enhancing effect of public commitments. Ex-
perimental work shows that observers rate a person who changes his 
mind as weaker, more poorly-adjusted, more indecisive, and more insin-
cere than a person whose attitudes remain constant.”
257
 Cognitive con-
sistency is a subconscious effort to protect one’s reputation against 
these perceptions.  
Judicial reputation may, however, be different. To a substantial de-
gree, the ideal judicial reputation is one of “impartiality and openmin-
dedness.”
258
 A judge’s decision to make changes on rehearing—after 
having made a public and final commitment to a particular position as 
the “correct” one—might make the judge appear weak and incompe-
tent. But a judge’s willingness to amend a tentative opinion on the basis 
of informative comments might well be seen as a sign of genuine impar-
tiality and as proof that the judge’s decisions are driven by the facts 
and the law, not by preconceptions and political commitments.
259
 In-
deed, those courts that have experimented with releasing tentative 
  
 255 Stern, 63 U Pitt L Rev at 591 (cited in note 171). Stern explains that merely writing 
down preliminary views can contribute to lock-in. See id at 619. 
 256 See note 168–69 and accompanying text.  
 257 See Stern, 63 U Pitt L Rev at 616–17 (cited in note 171). 
 258 See Republican Party of Minnesota v White, 536 US 765, 802 (2002) (Stevens dissenting). 
 259 To the extent that cognitive consistency bias might still apply to tentative opinions, there 
are steps that could be taken to mitigate it. For example, studies suggest that when individuals 
write down their original opinions anonymously, they will be less intent on cognitive consistency. 
See Stern, 63 U Pitt L Rev at 617 (cited in note 171) (reviewing studies that show publicity re-
sults in cognitive commitment). At least in an appellate court, the opinion might initially be 
designated per curiam; the judges could decide later whether to name the opinion author in the 
final opinion. See Hollenhorst, 36 Santa Clara L Rev at 4 (cited in note 10) (noting that the 
practice in courts that release pre-argument tentative opinions to the parties has been to with-
hold the authoring judge’s name). 
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opinions even earlier in the process—before oral argument—have 
found that judges are generally quite willing to make changes despite 
having expressed a tentative preference for a particular approach.
260
 
Concerns about premature cognitive commitment do, however, il-
lustrate the relative advantage of notice and comment over the prac-
tice of issuing tentative opinions prior to oral argument. Stern notes 
that in the administrative context, use of a tool like an Advance No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking can serve as at least a partial antidote to 
cognitive commitment, encouraging the submission of arguments be-
fore decisionmakers have reached their conclusions.
261
 The judicial 
context already includes a version of this tool by providing an oppor-
tunity to submit briefs. Unlike administrative officials, judges ordinari-
ly consider briefs before making tentative commitments. Oral argument 
similarly is structured in a way that promotes consideration of issues 
without making commitments on those issues. It is a common practice 
for judges to play devil’s advocate in oral argument, so questions that 
judges ask do not necessarily reveal their positions.
262
 Indeed, judges 
insist that they often do not make up their minds until after oral ar-
gument.
263
 Because of cognitive commitment, issuing tentative opi-
nions before oral argument could undermine the effectiveness of this 
opportunity, as well as of the internal deliberations that generally take 
place among judges immediately after oral argument. As just noted, 
judges in courts that release pre-argument tentative opinions generally 
have been willing to make changes to their opinions based on the oral 
argument proceedings. Still, there is a risk that releasing pre-argument 
tentative opinions can make oral argument less effective.
264
 
  
 260 See note 223. In the Arizona court, judges made at least minor changes in 100 percent of 
published opinions. See Hummels, 46 Ariz L Rev at 349 (cited in note 10). 
 261 See Stern, 63 U Pitt L Rev at 633 (cited in note 171). An Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking is issued earlier in the rulemaking process than a traditional notice of proposed 
rulemaking and is more open-ended, soliciting public comments on an issue generally, or seeking 
comments on a variety of alternative potential solutions. See id.  
 262 But see Sarah Levien Shullman, The Illusion of Devil’s Advocacy: How the Justices of the 
Supreme Court Foreshadow Their Decisions during Oral Argument, 6 J App Prac & Process 271, 
272 (2004). 
 263 See David Lewis, Survey Shows Preferences of Northeastern Judges at Appellate Argu-
ment, 76 NY St B J 42, 42–43 (Oct 2004) (presenting results of survey that found substantial 
disagreement among judges about whether they have made up their minds on important issues 
prior to oral argument). 
 264 See Robert S. Thompson and John B. Oakley, From Information to Opinion in Appellate 
Courts: How Funny Things Happen on the Way through the Forum, 1986 Ariz St L J 1, 65:  
If a court has reached a conclusion, even one that is labeled “tentative,” oral argument in-
volves a process by which minds must be changed rather than open minds persuaded. If the 
minds have been made up by overlooking important information or approaches to the case, 
the task may be difficult indeed.  
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III.  OBSTACLES AND OBJECTIONS 
This Part considers a variety of obstacles and objections to our 
proposal. We first consider the question of cost, including costs to liti-
gants and to the courts themselves. We next consider an intimately 
related question: whether it is possible or desirable to implement an 
enforcement mechanism for the notice-and-comment regime. The an-
swers to both of those questions depend in part on the third question 
that we consider: whether it might be possible to devise a filtering me-
chanism that would narrow the number of comments that judges 
would need to consider. After considering a number of factors, we 
conclude that a simple filtering mechanism—requiring lawyers to cer-
tify that their responses are not duplicative and strictly limiting the 
length of responses—would considerably limit costs and make reputa-
tional enforcement more successful, thus obviating the need for a 
more formal enforcement regime. 
A. Costs 
The most obvious costs of a system of notice and comment stem 
from the time devoted to the new system, including both the cost of 
the effort itself and the cost associated with potentially delayed deci-
sionmaking.
265
 The effort that judges and law clerks spend scrutinizing 
comments is a cost borne directly by the taxpayer, assuming as is rea-
sonable that this additional burden does not come entirely out of judi-
cial leisure time. Presumably, greater workloads in the long run will 
necessitate more judges, and indeed the history of our courts is a his-
tory of steady growth in the number of judges and clerks with rising 
caseloads.
266
 We doubt that it is possible to prove rigorously that an 
increase in the quality of the judicial work product would be worth 
the financial cost of an attendant marginal increase in the number of 
required judges. Our instinct is that if the notice-and-comment process 
focuses judges on vulnerable parts of their tentative approaches (ra-
ther than, for example, on comments of minimal value
267
), this would 
be a relatively good investment. 
But we may not have to face that tradeoff. A notice-and-
comment process might not, in fact, increase aggregate litigation ex-
penses or judicial workloads. One consequence of an expensive legal 
  
 265 Delay may be especially costly in the Supreme Court, which generally issues the last of a 
term’s opinions by early summer, just before new clerks arrive. See Stern, et al, Supreme Court 
Practice at 9–11, 36–37 (cited in note 142). Delaying the release of opinions might mean that new 
clerks will need to learn details from cases already tentatively decided. 
 266 See Authorized Judgeships, online at http://www.uscourts.gov/history/allauth.pdf (visited Sept 
1, 2009) (providing data on the number of authorized federal judgeships from 1789 to the present). 
 267 See Part III.C.1.  
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process is that litigants, fearful of the expense, are more likely to settle 
their cases.
268
 Thus, if expenses per case increase, there are likely to be 
at least somewhat fewer cases. Under some models, a marginal dollar 
per case increase in litigation expenditure can even lead to a decrease 
in total expenditures across all cases.
269
 Presumably we should not in-
crease the expense of the legal process when doing so will not increase 
the quality of decisionmaking. But when increased costs per case yield 
better quality decisions, they often can be implemented without a sig-
nificant corresponding increase in aggregate costs.  
Indeed, in the long run, precisely because it will yield clearer and 
higher quality decisions, notice and comment may well reduce aggregate 
costs by reducing the volume of subsequent litigation.
270
 The notice-and-
comment process should be a particularly useful vehicle for informing 
courts about the implications of tentative decisions for future cases. Par-
ties should be much better positioned to identify possible ambiguities 
once they know the specific language that a court seems poised to en-
dorse, and the involvement of nonparties should be particularly useful 
in calling attention to possible effects of a decision. In addition, both 
parties and nonparties might point courts to potentially conflicting pre-
cedents, giving courts a chance to avoid splits of authority, including 
subtle tensions that might cause later litigation. In short, the notice-and-
comment process seems likely to help courts tie up loose ends that they 
otherwise would need to address later in costly fallout litigation.  
We do, however, concede that it is possible that whatever litigation 
savings accrue from adoption of notice and comment do not compen-
sate entirely for the time and expense that commenters and judges will 
devote to the notice-and-comment process. What then would be lost, 
and would it be worth it? An increase in the number of judges seems 
unlikely to compensate entirely for any increase in the judicial burden. 
Historically, the number of cases processed per judge has been rising,
271
 
and at least in recent years, the number of law clerks has been relatively 
  
 268 See, for example, Laura Inglis, et al, Experiments on the Effects of Cost-shifting, Court 
Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 Fla St U L Rev 89, 90–91 
(2005) (reporting that in a laboratory experiment simulating litigation, “increased court costs 
significantly improve pretrial settlement rates”); id at 116 (reporting a settlement rate of 58.7 
percent with low costs and 77.7 percent with high costs). 
 269 See, for example, Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman, Against Compromise: A Mechanism 
Design Approach, 6 J L, Econ, & Org 285, 287 (2005) (noting that some models allow for this 
possibility, but presenting an alternative model that does not). 
 270 Consider Stark, 54 Tax L Rev at 256 (cited in note 80) (noting “the cost, chaos, and addi-
tional litigation that often follow” judicial decisions that were based on imperfect information). 
 271 See Richard A. Posner, Demand and Supply Trends in Federal and State Courts over the 
Last Half Century, 8 J App Prac & Process 133, 134 & 139 table 6 (2006) (illustrating trends in per 
judge caseloads and observing a “dramatic increase in federal appellate caseloads per judge”). 
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fixed despite continued increases in caseloads.
272
 This means that each 
judge must spend less time on average on each individual case. A judge 
devoting more time to comments might thus spend less time on other 
aspects of each case. For example, judges might spend slightly less time 
preparing for oral argument or crafting their initial opinions. 
If this tradeoff did occur at the margin, we suspect that the no-
tice-and-comment process would still be worthwhile. One can debate 
how much time a judge ideally would spend crafting an initial opinion 
and how much time he would spend considering objections presented 
by the public.
273
 But the current approach, where the amount of time 
devoted to considering such objections is set at zero, almost certainly 
does not achieve a sensible balance. We cannot be sure that judges will 
allocate their time according to the social optimum (whatever it may 
be), but we doubt that judges generally will pay so much attention to 
comments that the balance will shift so far in that direction as to be 
worse than the status quo.  
Much the same argument can be applied to litigants’ time. We 
would be willing to accept, for example, a reduction in the maximum 
brief length of one thousand words if those one thousand words (or 
even a smaller number) could be used instead for comments. The 
principle of declining marginal returns suggests that it makes sense to 
reallocate some litigant effort from the front-end to the back-end. 
In any event, it is quite possible that if the notice-and-comment 
process does, on net, demand some sacrifice in judicial time, that sacri-
fice will often be made across cases rather than within cases. Judges 
already spend considerably more time on cases in which they write 
detailed opinions than on cases resolved with brief per curiam or non-
  
 272 See, for example, Todd Peppers, et al, Inside Judicial Chambers: How Federal District 
Court Judges Select and Use Their Law Clerks, 71 Alb L Rev 623, 628 (2008) (noting that since 
1991, the number of clerks per federal district judge has been fixed at two). 
 273 Radically reducing the amount of time spent on the tentative opinion—on the theory 
that most of the serious thinking about the case can be done after the many resulting flaws are 
clarified through public comment—would defeat the purpose of notice and comment, which is 
designed to solicit public comments on the precise reasoning and wording contemplated by the 
court. But, at the other extreme, under our current system, because a “judge drafting a precedential 
opinion must not only consider the facts of the immediate case, but must also envision the countless 
permutations of facts that might arise in the universe of future cases,” Hart v Massanari, 266 F3d 
1155, 1176–77 (9th Cir 2001) (Kozinski), “writing an opinion is a tough, delicate, exacting, time-
consuming process,” Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
32.1, 51 Fed Law 36, 39 (June 2004). It is possible that, with the backstop of notice and comment, a 
judge would sensibly spend a little less time on “the process of anticipating how the language of the 
disposition will be read by future litigants and courts, and how small variations in wording might 
be imbued with meanings never intended,” a task that currently occupies a huge percentage of 
the judge’s time. Id at 38–39. See also Hart, 266 F3d at 1176–77. 
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precedential opinions.
274
 Judge Alex Kozinski estimates that on the 
Ninth Circuit, judges spend only “an average of five or 10 minutes” on 
cases with nonprecedential opinions drafted by staff attorneys.
275
 As-
signment of even a handful of additional cases to be handled by staff 
attorneys would free up ample time to engage in the notice-and-
comment process for the remaining fully considered cases.  
Of course, there are downsides to deciding cases by unpublished 
opinions.
276
 And the forced shifting of more cases into the unpublished 
pile would seem to necessitate reduced attention to some cases that 
are currently understood to warrant more careful treatment. It is quite 
possible, however, that a notice-and-comment system would actually 
improve the functioning of the two-tiered system of case assignment. 
When a judge resolves a case summarily, it is presumably because the 
judge (or the court employee responsible for the initial assignment) 
believes that the case is straightforward. Judge Kozinski expresses 
confidence that the Ninth Circuit always reaches the right result in 
cases resolved summarily.
277
 But because the court will not have under-
taken as rigorous a review of the briefs and case law as with an ob-
viously more difficult case, the court or its staff attorneys might have 
missed subtle issues.
278
 There may also be a danger that a court might, 
for impermissible reasons such as ideology, strategically choose in 
which cases to write an opinion.
279
 For these reasons, it would be useful 
for there to be an additional check on the court’s initial classifica-
tion.
280
 Notice and comment could provide that check. The court could 
impose draconian length limitations for comments on those draft opi-
nions that are tentatively designated as unpublished, forcing the liti-
  
 274 The trend has been toward increasing resolution of cases through unpublished decisions. 
See, for example, Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 L 
Libr J 475, 478 (2004) (documenting an increase in nonpublication rates in the US courts of 
appeals from about 50 percent in 1981 to about 80 percent in 2004). 
 275 Kozinski, 51 Fed Law at 38 (cited in note 273). 
 276 See, for example, Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judg-
ing in the U.S. Courts, 56 Stan L Rev 1435, 1471–74 (2004). 
 277 Kozinski, 51 Fed Law at 38 (cited in note 273) (“We are very careful to ensure that the 
result we reach in every case is right, and I believe we succeed.”). 
 278 See Wald, 62 U Chi L Rev at 1375 (cited in note 153) (noting that without published 
opinions, there are “no backward looks or self-doubt”). 
 279 See, for example, Hellman, 6 J App Prac & Process at 173 (cited in note 159) (noting that 
lawyers have “voiced the concern that unpublished opinions are used as a device to avoid con-
trolling precedents”); Wald, 62 U Chi L Rev at 1374 (cited in note 153) (discussing the misuse of 
unpublished opinions to avoid making or following law). But see Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished 
Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J App Prac & 
Process 325, 340–41 (2001) (arguing that judges do not generally engage in this behavior).  
 280 Judge Wald similarly argues, “There ought, in my view, to be periodic overviews of which 
kinds of cases get sent down one track rather than another. Danger signals include the presence of 
obviously difficult issues. . . .” Wald, 62 U Chi L Rev at 1376 (cited in note 153). But it is difficult to 
find such danger signals without a mechanism for pointing out problems before opinions issue. 
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gants to focus in the comment phase on a single discrete aspect of the 
case that the court might have missed.
281
 This seems likely to be the 
best strategy to persuade judges who initially viewed the case as easy 
(or who relied on the judgment of a court employee to that effect) that 
they should pay it more attention, and perhaps even consider drafting a 
full opinion.
282
 Concise comments identifying glossed over issues might 
also deter a court from strategic misclassification. 
Of course, part of the cost of notice-and-comment review would 
come in the form of additional delays. Naturally, it is faster for a court 
simply to release an opinion than to give the public one or more 
rounds of comments on drafts. The appellate process in particular is 
already lengthy enough to provoke substantial criticism,
283
 and, at first 
glance anyway, notice and comment would make it longer still. But if a 
court is willing to spend, for example, a year considering the issues in a 
case and drafting an opinion, why should it not be willing to spend a 
couple of additional months making sure that it did not make any mis-
takes? (To be sure, it would be wise to structure the process in a way 
that the court would have the discretion to curtail or eliminate it when 
time is of the essence.
284
)  
In any event, allowing notice-and-comment processes need not, in 
equilibrium, greatly lengthen case pendency. First, if courts adjust to 
increased amounts of work per case by fully developing fewer cases, 
then the total workload of courts need not increase. While the notice-
and-comment period itself takes time, if courts have less other work, 
then the period between the submission of briefs and the issuance of 
the tentative opinion should be shorter. Second, studies have found no 
systematic relationship between judicial caseloads and queue length.
285
 
  
 281 Those length limits would, in turn, ensure that the notice-and-comment procedure would 
not significantly add to the judicial workload for unpublished cases. (It seems unlikely that non-
parties would be interested in commenting on opinions with little or no precedential value. To 
keep the workload under control, courts could even mandate that only the parties may comment 
on unpublished opinions.). 
 282 See Hollenhorst, 36 Santa Clara L Rev at 23 (cited in note 10) (noting that, in California, 
discussion of tentative opinions at oral argument sometimes convinces judges to change their 
minds about whether to publish the opinion). 
 283 See, for example, Hillary A. Taylor, Appellate Delay as Reversible Error, 44 Willamette L 
Rev 761, 787–89 (2008) (focusing on appellate delay in the criminal context). 
 284 Indeed, it would be wise to allow courts to skip notice and comment for any good cause, 
as is the case with notice and comment in the administrative rulemaking context. See 5 USC 
§ 553 (b)(3)(B) (providing that the notice-and-comment requirements do not apply “when the 
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons there-
for in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, 
or contrary to the public interest”). 
 285 See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 BU L Rev 
527, 529–30 (1989) (reviewing studies of court congestion). 
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Increased delays lead to increased settlement, thus lessening delay, and so 
queuing time has proven relatively immune to attempts at intervention.
286
  
B. Enforcement Mechanisms 
In the administrative agency context, officials do not have merely 
an option of considering comments submitted, but an affirmative obli-
gation to respond in detail to important comments. This obligation 
stems from both procedural and substantive provisions of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.
287
 Courts have interpreted the Act’s procedur-
al requirement that agencies provide a “concise, general statement of 
the basis and purpose”
288
 of a rulemaking to require a lengthy and spe-
cific statement.
289
 And the substantive requirement that courts set 
aside agency action that is “arbitrary” or “capricious”
290
 serves as an 
additional hook for judicial scrutiny of agency responses.
291
 In enforc-
ing this requirement, courts have developed a “hard look doctrine,”
292
 
through which they ensure that agencies have done sufficiently hard 
looking at the problem and the public’s comments.  
Any analysis of the cost and efficacy of notice and comment in 
the judicial arena must consider whether the procedure would include 
a mechanism, analogous to the hard look doctrine in administrative 
law, designed to enforce the expectation that judges will consider and 
respond to illuminating comments. While it is possible as a theoretical 
matter to imagine such a mechanism, if a legislature or the courts were 
  
 286 See id at 539–56 (presenting a case study of whether “the decision to litigate or settle is 
sufficiently sensitive to changes in litigation delay to generate a congestion equilibrium”). 
 287 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub L No 89-554, 80 Stat 381 (1966), codified as 
amended at 5 USC § 551 et seq. 
 288 5 USC § 553(c). 
 289 See, for example, Automotive Parts and Accessories Association v Boyd, 407 F2d 330, 338 
(DC Cir 1968) (warning “against an overly literal reading of the statutory terms ‘concise’ and 
‘general,’” and noting that “[t]hese adjectives must be accommodated to the realities of judicial 
scrutiny”); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U Chi L Rev 1383, 
1432 (2004) (“The ‘concise general’ statement of ‘basis and purpose’ that is to accompany the 
final rule has, in the hands of judges, turned out to be not at all concise.”). 
 290 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (defining the scope of review). 
 291 Whether this is a plausible doctrinal hook is debatable. See, for example, Jack M. Beer-
man and Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Geo Wash L Rev 856, 882 (2007) 
(“Hard-look review may or may not be a correct or even plausible interpretation of 
§ 706(2)(A)—a point on which the authors are not necessarily in full agreement.”). 
 292 A helpful statement of this doctrine appears in Greater Boston Television Corp v FCC: 
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case of procedural in-
adequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the 
court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has 
not really taken a “hard look” at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in 
reasoned decision-making. 
444 F2d 841, 851 (DC Cir 1970). 
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so inclined, we believe it unlikely that any such mechanism would 
have much of a chance of actually being implemented. We think, how-
ever, that notice and comment would still prove effective even in the 
absence of a formal enforcement mechanism. 
One possible enforcement mechanism would borrow from the 
administrative law rule that permits disappointed litigants to appeal 
judicial decisions not only on the basis of their substance but also on 
hard look grounds. An appellate court, for example, might consider 
first a contention that a trial judge had failed to address significant 
arguments made by a commenter. If the appellate court agreed with 
this assessment, then it would remand the decision (perhaps subject to 
the harmless error doctrine
293
) without regard for whether it agreed 
with the trial court’s substantive conclusion or whether alternative 
grounds for affirmance existed.
294
 
An alternative approach would be for judicial decisionmaking to 
be subject to a version of the Chenery doctrine,
295
 under which the 
courts can affirm an administrative decision only on the actual basis 
used by the administrative agency to reach that decision. Under this 
approach, if the lower court failed to respond adequately to an in-
sightful comment, the winning litigant below could not help its cause 
in its appellate brief by offering a response to a counterargument 
made by a commenter. No matter how persuasive, that response could 
not be used to defend the judicial decision if the lower court judge did 
not incorporate the response into the final opinion.
296
 
These approaches have the potential to offer considerable bene-
fits, assuming that judges seek to avoid being reversed or remanded.
297
 
The first approach would encourage judges to consider and respond 
directly to any arguments that a reviewing court might consider impor-
tant. The second approach would similarly give courts some incentive to 
  
 293 By limiting its scope to “salient” issues, see id, hard look review of administrative deci-
sions already includes a rough equivalent to the harmless error doctrine. It is possible, however, 
to imagine that poor reasoning would be grounds for remand of a judicial decision even if there 
was an adequate ground for the decision. 
 294 Of course, this approach could not easily be applied to decisions of supreme courts. We 
could fancifully imagine a rule that decisions of the supreme court could be appealed to a panel 
of lower-court judges, who would be allowed to engage only in hard look review. 
 295 See SEC v Chenery Corp (Chenery II), 332 US 194, 196 (1947). 
 296 This is, of course, not the current approach in the judicial context. See Kevin Stack, The 
Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 Yale L J 952, 955 (2007) (contrasting the Chenery 
rule with the rule that an appellate court must affirm a correct lower court judgment even when 
the lower court relied upon an incorrect ground or reason). 
 297 See Posner, 3 S Ct Econ Rev at 14–15 (cited in note 36) (noting that judges do not like 
being reversed, but that appellate judges often do not care as much about reversal, because it 
usually results from differences in judicial philosophy). Reversal might be more of a concern to 
judges—including appellate judges—if based on the quality of an opinion rather than on its 
result, as under these enforcement mechanisms. 
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consider comments sufficiently important to potentially change a re-
viewing court’s analysis of the merits, and it might sometimes even give 
a prevailing party an incentive to identify weaknesses in a court’s tenta-
tive opinion. Nonetheless, the costs of these approaches would be 
extraordinarily high. Precisely because they fear reversal, lower courts 
might have an incentive to invest resources responding to every single 
comment and argument that might possibly catch the eye of the review-
ing court. And reviewing courts would find themselves tasked with far 
more work as well. Particularly under the first approach, every case 
would suddenly have many more appealable issues, and indeed more 
could be manufactured through the submission of comments in re-
sponse to the tentative opinion. Extending hard look review to judicial 
decisionmaking would thus demand a vast increase in judicial resources, 
one that almost certainly would not be justified. Whatever the ultimate 
cost-benefit balance, such a change seems extraordinarily unlikely. 
Could we imagine enforcement mechanisms that would occupy 
less judicial time? One possibility would be a sampling mechanism: 
random selection of some percentage of cases (perhaps 1 percent or 5 
percent) for some form of hard look review. After the notice-and-
comment period and publication of a final opinion, a pseudo-random 
number generator would be used to determine whether hard look re-
view would be appropriate in a particular case. So long as the percen-
tage of reviewed cases is high enough to weigh on the judges’ minds as 
they consider the comments, this system would provide incentives for 
careful consideration. But it too might encourage wasteful actions by 
reversal-fearing judges. And, in any event, we suspect that this too 
seems unlikely to be adopted. Randomization is hardly foreign to the 
judicial process; judges are assigned to cases at random,
298
 as are judicial 
districts in some cases when multiple venues are possible.
299
 But there 
would likely be considerable opposition to randomization determining 
the rights of litigants, even if the right at stake is quasi-procedural. 
Perhaps more likely would be a random selection of cases for a 
hard look analysis that would have no direct consequences for the 
litigation itself. Such analysis could be integrated into a broader judi-
cial performance evaluation program, like those existing in many 
states.
300
 An independent group, consisting perhaps of respected senior 
attorneys and retired judges, would review randomly selected opinions 
  
 298 See Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judi-
ciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J Legal Stud 257, 266–69 (1995) 
(offering an empirical analysis appearing to verify that judicial selection is genuinely random). 
 299 See 28 USC § 2112(a)(3) (requiring that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
use random selection to designate courts of appeals to hear certain cases). 
 300 See Kourlis and Singer, 86 Denver U L Rev at 9 (cited in note 19) (noting that nineteen 
states have such programs). 
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after judgments became final to issue a public assessment of the quali-
ty of reasoning in light of the comments submitted. The costs of such a 
system would be relatively small, as long as the percentage of cases 
selected for review was sufficiently small. The benefits, meanwhile, 
would be relatively invariant to the percentage.  
As with many judicial performance evaluation programs, the ef-
fect of the sanction would be reputational, and as long as a sufficient 
number of any judge’s cases are sampled to make assessments statisti-
cally meaningful, the exact number sampled is of little consequence. 
An advantage over other judicial evaluation proposals is that this ap-
proach provides a systematic means of assessing judicial work prod-
uct.
301
 Because these evaluations, even in the absence of sanctions, 
would be assessing a judge’s reasoning and professionalism rather 
than the merits of the case, they could have even greater reputational 
effects than ordinary appellate review. In our existing system, judges 
can chalk up a high reversal rate to differences in legal philosophy;
302
 
under this system, they could not.  
These reviews should thus focus not on the merits, but on wheth-
er the judges have fairly considered and responded adequately to rea-
sonable arguments, both in the original briefs and in the comments. It 
may not be possible for reviewers to place aside ideological considera-
tions altogether,
303
 but the goal should be to analyze judicial craft. In 
addition, the reviews should take into account that it will not generally 
be practical (or even desirable) for a judge to respond to all nonfri-
volous arguments and comments. For example, a reviewer might well 
not penalize a judge for a brief discussion or no discussion at all of an 
issue if elaboration of that issue would have no reasonable chance of 
changing the conclusion, and a reviewer also might take into account 
the importance of an issue or the importance of a case. The notice-
and-comment system cannot and should not lead judges to address in 
writing every conceivable issue, but it can seek to ensure that judges 
fairly address important and potentially dispositive ones. 
Indeed, the possibility of reputational rather than formal sanc-
tions for ignoring comments suggests that a notice-and-comment sys-
tem could have a significant benefit in the judicial context even absent 
  
 301 Kourlis and Singer suggest that an independent commission might evaluate a variety of 
data sources, including a “sample of written orders,” but they do not indicate how this sample 
might be constructed. See id at 41. Moreover, opinions with comments may be easier to evaluate 
than if the commission is expected to undertake its own research into a case. 
 302 See, for example, Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the 
Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 Or L Rev 405, 488 (1998) (concluding that the “high reversal 
rate of the Ninth Circuit is attributable to an ideological difference between the Supreme Court 
and the reversed panels on the Ninth Circuit”). See also note 297. 
 303 See notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
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any enforcement mechanism. In the administrative context, we sus-
pect that the reputational costs of negative hard look reviews are rela-
tively small, though perhaps not altogether absent.
304
 What matters most 
to agency heads is that such reviews block the rulemaking and waste 
the employees’ time, either because the rulemaking is abandoned
305
 or 
because further efforts must be made to address the court’s concerns 
about reasoning deficiencies. In the courts, we suspect that these rela-
tive priorities would be reversed. It would be no great burden, if a full 
hard look review system existed, to amend a judicial opinion when an 
appellate court concluded that a judge had paid insufficient attention to 
a particular issue. But even without formal hard look review, a notice-
and-comment system has the potential to embarrass, for example if 
commenters pointed out a glaring error or omission in the opinion, or a 
failure to confront a serious argument that had been made in the briefs. 
At present, it is difficult for the public to assess the degree to 
which a judge confronts all relevant arguments and authorities. The 
notice-and-comment system makes it considerably easier than before; 
looking at comments and amendments to opinions can give someone 
scrutinizing a judge a sense of the degree to which the judge takes 
arguments in briefs and in the comment period into account, and the 
extent to which her reasoning is sound. A formal evaluation system 
would make it easier still, but is not essential for notice-and-comment 
procedures to have some constraining power.
306
 
C. The Filtering Problem 
One imagines that certain high-profile cases could produce a de-
luge of comments, mostly of little value, swamping the court with pa-
perwork. In order to be most effective, a notice-and-comment system 
would need to develop some method for separating the wheat from 
the chaff. It is worth thinking about high-tech options for doing so, 
though such options are more fanciful than feasible, at least in the 
short run. Fortunately, however, it would be relatively simple to im-
  
 304 Commentators have discussed the impact of hard look review of administrative deci-
sions on judicial reputation. See, for example, Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: 
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 
Tex L Rev 483, 503 (1997) (suggesting changes to hard look review to “increase the reputational 
cost to judges” who perform badly). But we have found no sustained discussion of the effect of 
hard look review on agency officials’ reputation. 
 305 An empirical study of all sixty-one DC Circuit remands of rules over a ten-year period 
ending in 1995 found that there were twelve remands that led to agency abandonment of the 
rulemaking, at least with respect to the points on which the courts based their remands. See 
William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly 
Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw 
U L Rev 393, 433 (2000). 
 306 See Part II.B.2.c. 
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plement crude, low-tech options that would, we believe, achieve suffi-
cient filtering to make our proposal viable.  
1.  The need for filtering. 
The capacity of a notice-and-comment process to improve judicial 
decisionmaking may be inversely proportional to the number of com-
ments submitted, particularly low-value comments. Some administrative 
rulemaking processes produce only a small number of comments,
307
 and 
it is likely that many judicial proceedings, particularly on relatively low-
profile cases in lower courts, would produce only a small number as 
well. But high-profile cases, like high-profile rulemakings, might invite a 
torrent of comments with little substantive value. Lost in the haystack is 
the needle, the occasional insightful comment. A judge will probably 
not be embarrassed by an insightful comment if no one notices it 
among the many less insightful ones. Indeed, a well-meaning and con-
scientious judge might miss the comment in the sea of useless hay, 
even if the judge would have been inclined to take it seriously.
308
 
If there were an enforcement regime, even one that merely sam-
pled a judge’s decisions, judges would have some incentive to find the 
most meaningful comments. But a large volume of comments would 
make an enforcement regime all the more cumbersome. Indeed, the 
large number of comments submitted sometimes in the administrative 
context, many either of low value or cogent but targeting peripheral 
issues, contributes to a sense among many scholars that the rulemak-
ing process is “ossified.”
309
 Tom McGarity argues that because agencies 
“can never know what issues dissatisfied litigants will raise on appeal, 
[agencies] must attempt to prepare responses to all contentions that 
may prove credible to an appellate court, no matter how ridiculous 
they may appear to agency staff.”
310
 Even Mark Seidenfeld, a skeptic 
on proposals to reduce ossification, acknowledges that “parties op-
  
 307 See Stuart Shapiro, Two Months in the Life of the Regulatory State, 11 Admin & Reg L 
News 12, 13 (2005) (reporting that the median number of comments in a sample of eighty-four 
rulemakings was one, and that “the distribution is quite skewed: a very few [rulemakings] receive 
a high percentage of the total”).  
 308 Justice Ginsburg has noted that even “a gem” contained in an amicus brief can be 
missed because of the sheer volume of briefs. Simard, 27 Rev Litig at 700–01 (cited in note 112). 
Given the low cost of filing comments, relative to amicus briefs, one imagines that an unfiltered 
commenting system has the potential to generate a volume of comments in the Supreme Court 
in high profile cases that dwarfs the already substantial volume of amicus briefs. 
 309 See, for example, Pierce, 47 Admin L Rev at 59–60 (cited in note 209) (suggesting a 
number of methods to alleviate ossification); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossify-
ing” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L J 1385, 1386 (1992). 
 310 McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1412 (cited in note 309). 
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posed to an agency rule have every incentive to raise every issue and 
introduce every factor that undercuts the agency’s decision.”
311
 
A large number of comments can inhibit not only the constraint 
function, but also the informational function, of notice and comment. 
Assuming that a judge genuinely wants to know about reasonable 
critiques of a tentative opinion released for comment, it will be helpful 
if the judge has some means of identifying the most relevant critiques. 
A judge can, of course, delegate the task to law clerks, in much the 
same way as an agency head can delegate the task to employees. But 
this does not necessarily lower the total costs of evaluation, and it in-
creases the cost to the judge of monitoring judicial clerks, who some-
times may have incentives (conscious or subconscious) to conceal, or 
to treat as frivolous, criticisms of opinions that they have drafted.  
Thus, notice and comment might be considerably more effective 
if there were a mechanism for filtering comments—keeping down the 
volume of unhelpful comments or identifying specific comments as 
the ones to which a court should pay close attention. Indeed, this 
would be useful in the administrative context as well. The current sys-
tem in the administrative context might be seen as a form of ex post 
filtering, with the reviewing court determining which comments the 
administrative agency should have answered. What would be prefera-
ble is a system of ex ante filtering: an identification before the final 
decision issues of the comments on which the agency or judge should 
focus. This would increase the ability of the public to monitor the deli-
berative process of the decisionmakers, even without an enforcement 
regime. Agency officials could spend less time on relatively unimpor-
tant comments and more time on the more important ones, and they 
would avoid the danger that ex post evaluators might have a different 
view of their relative importance. 
The task for both agencies and courts is not simply to weed out 
comments with no legal or policy content. Some comments may be 
lucid but peripheral. This could be so for at least two reasons. First, a 
comment might refer to a relatively unimportant aspect of a proposed 
decision. We do not mean to suggest that comments should be filtered 
down to the single most powerful discrete point. But filtering down to 
a relatively small number of the most important issues—taking into 
account both the immediate case and the opinion’s impact on future 
cases—could simplify the decisionmaking process without significant-
ly reducing the quality of decisions.  
Second, sometimes it might be clear that a court or an agency 
could respond effectively to a comment, and the value in forcing the 
  
 311 Seidenfeld, 75 Tex L Rev at 515 (cited in note 304). 
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court or agency to do so is low. Cognitive psychology suggests that 
decisions are generally based on a small number of salient arguments, 
rather than based on complex decision trees.
312
 The details offered in a 
written justification of a decision are sometimes ex post rationaliza-
tions. Ideally, a filtering mechanism would identify comments regard-
ing these details when they are powerful enough to unravel an entire 
argument, or when they have significant implications for later deci-
sions. But where a comment points out some new line of analysis not 
considered, and it is apparent that reasonable decisionmakers could 
and likely would develop sufficient counterarguments to make rejec-
tion of this tangentially relevant analysis acceptable, and that the 
process of specifically writing down these counterarguments seems 
unlikely to change the decisionmakers’ views, actually forcing deci-
sionmakers through this process sometimes may not be helpful.  
Indeed, doing so has the potential to be counterproductive. Deci-
sionmakers, intent on achieving a particular resolution on a peripheral 
issue, might end up offering weak but detailed arguments that could 
have negative impact in future cases. For example, suppose that Pre-
cedents A, B, and C have facts quite analogous to those in the instant 
case, while Precedent D’s facts bear a weaker analogical relationship 
to the present facts. If a commenter presses the court on ignored 
Precedent D, the court might well offer an interpretation of 
Precedent D designed to provide a plausible answer to the comment, 
but this reading might have an impact on the future development of 
issues more closely related to Precedent D. This impact, moreover, 
might be negative if the court’s analysis of Precedent D is driven by 
issues only tangentially related to that precedent. Ideally, the notice-
and-comment process would not push a judge who simply ignored 
Precedent D to explain it, but would push a judge who misleadingly 
reads Precedent D to reconsider. Failure to address a tangential issue 
should not be seen as problematic, but superficial treatment of such an 
issue should be cause for concern because of effects on future cases. 
A filtering mechanism, in sum, would be useful for three related 
reasons. First, the mechanism might help identify a useful comment 
undermining the disposition of the current case. Second, the mechan-
ism might flag a comment identifying a portion of the court’s reason-
ing that seems unlikely to affect the outcome of the case, but that 
  
 312 The literature shows that when making a complex decision, a person will not work en-
tirely in a bottom-up manner, but will make an assessment based on a somewhat holistic sense of 
the evidence and then, if asked to make judgments on subissues, will generally ensure that those 
judgments cohere with the broader decision, even when they might not have had the same view 
taking the subissues in isolation. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Cohe-
rence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U Chi L Rev 511, 523–33 (2004). 
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could present problems later. Third, the mechanism might identify 
some criticisms of an opinion as relatively unimportant, either because 
the criticisms easily could be rebutted or because the criticisms identify 
an issue that, though unaddressed by the court, seems unlikely to affect 
the case outcome. With a filtering mechanism, notice-and-comment 
procedures need not make opinions inexorably longer. In the long run, 
opinion writers might feel more comfortable omitting tangential analy-
sis, while focusing more carefully on key points. Whether the end result 
would be opinions that are slightly longer or slightly shorter than they 
are currently, a filtering mechanism could ensure that the prose of judi-
cial opinions becomes more relevant and more deliberate. 
2. Web 2.0 possibilities. 
Bloggers, we have seen, have suggested that Web 2.0 could help 
the Supreme Court,
313
 but to be workable, this idea must be made 
more concrete. A website that merely collects comments might fit the 
Web 2.0 paradigm, but we doubt that such a website would provide 
much advantage in soliciting useful comments over a more conven-
tional notice-and-comment process. A website that not only solicits 
comments, but also identifies the most important ones might have 
more potential. But how to set one up? 
A hopeless approach would be to allow a wiki. Wikipedia is well 
known as the encyclopedia that everyone can edit. In theory, progres-
sive editing by multiple users could gradually improve comments on a 
judicial case, in much the same way as progressive editing improves 
the completeness of a summary of an episode of 24. One reason for 
Wikipedia’s relative success is that a community norm promotes 
viewpoint neutrality, and while Wikipedia includes a simple adjudica-
tive process for disputes, the arbitrators seek to avoid determining the 
truth about covered subjects.
314
 Neither this community norm nor an 
adjudicative process seems likely to work effectively in a context as 
subjective as judicial opinion evaluation. A critical feature of Wikipe-
dia is that users can “revert” the changes of others.
315
 This may work 
when the vast majority of users have roughly similar standards, but a 
“revert war” between thousands of pro-choice and pro-life Internet 
users, for instance, would not seem conducive to development of a 
coherent judicial opinion in an abortion case.  
  
 313 See notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 314 See David Hoffman and Salil Mehra, Wikitruth through Wikiorder: Using Dispute Resolution 
to Generate Public Goods, online at http://www.kauffman.org/ksli/resources.cfm (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
 315 See Help: Reverting, Wikipedia, online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Reverting 
(visited Sept 1, 2009) (describing the process of reverting and characterizing as “harmful” “revert 
wars” in which users continually revert each other’s edits). 
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Other Web 2.0 websites’ filtering functions have somewhat more 
promise. For example, on Digg.com, users can “Digg” a blog post or 
other Internet content, indicating their approval of it, and when many 
users have “Dugg” an article in a short period of time, it may appear 
on the website’s home page.
316
 The site thus provides value not just by 
identifying all posts that users have found interesting, but by highlight-
ing especially interesting posts. The possibility that a similar Web 2.0 
mechanism could be used to filter information presented to the gov-
ernment is not entirely hypothetical. A pilot project affiliated with the 
US Patent and Trademark office, called “peer to patent,”
317
 allows us-
ers to upload prior art claims. Users vote on individual prior art refer-
ences to determine which ones end up in the “top ten” references that 
are forwarded to the patent examiner.
318
 One can easily imagine ana-
logues to this in the judicial context.
319
 
We are doubtful that a mechanism of this type could serve as a suffi-
ciently robust filtering mechanism, however. The patent validity inquiry is 
relatively systematic; judicial reasoning is much more open-ended. And 
while the patent inquiry itself is somewhat subjective,
320
 the evaluation 
of the strength of many judicial arguments will be even more so. Finally, 
it is quite possible that interest groups will recruit voters to “Digg” ad-
vantageous (rather than legally sound) comments much in the way that 
interested websites link to online polls in order to try to skew the results. 
In our judgment, an online rating mechanism of this sort is not likely to 
add much value, and more broadly, Web 2.0 is unlikely to offer much of 
an improvement on Notice and Comment 1.0. 
We do not mean to suggest that it is impossible to design an effec-
tive online filtering mechanism, only that any plausible mechanism 
would be sufficiently complex that it seems unlikely that it could be 
included in any notice-and-comment system introduced in the near 
future. An adequate mechanism would need to include at least two 
features: First, there would need to be incentives for accurately rating 
comments, presumably with governmental financial encouragement. 
(It might also make sense to provide financial incentives for produc-
ing comments that receive high ratings, thus ensuring that comments 
  
 316 See What is Digg?, Digg, online at http://digg.com/about (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
 317 See Peer to Patent, online at http://www.peertopatent.org (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
 318 See id.  
 319 For an interesting assessment of how technology might be used to structure the notice-
and-comment administrative rulemaking process and to foster the development of deliberative 
communities contributing to individual rulemakings, see Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic 
Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 Emory L J 433, 480–92 (2004). 
 320 See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive 
Regimes, 61 U Miami L Rev 1033, 1036 (2007) (noting that many believe unpredictability in 
patent claim construction to be a serious problem). 
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do not come disproportionately from special interest groups, but also 
from thoughtful, disinterested experts.) Second, robust mechanisms 
for preventing manipulation by those submitting ratings would be re-
quired. The notice-and-comment system is designed to encourage 
submission of comments from interested parties, but if some type of 
rating system were to assess the quality of these comments, it is impor-
tant that ratings based on self-interest are excluded from the cumula-
tive rating. In other words, the comments will often be self-
interested—seeking to achieve changes to the opinion that will benefit 
the commenter—but the raters must be interested only in identifying 
the best comments that are most likely to be of interest to the court. 
The raters’ legitimate self-interest is only in receiving incentives (fi-
nancial or otherwise) for identifying the comments that the court 
would consider most important; the raters must not be allowed to give 
high ratings to comments only because they have similar self-interest 
in the subject matter as the commenters.  
In theory, it is possible that prediction markets could serve this 
role.
321
 It is straightforward to subsidize participants in prediction mar-
kets,
322
 and research suggests that prediction markets cannot be easily 
manipulated because traders have incentives to identify manipulation 
and trade against it.
323
 A prediction market might be used, for example, 
to forecast the probability that, if a comment were highlighted,
324
 the 
decisionmaker would respond to it in some way. Lawyers and law stu-
dents might participate in this market in an effort to earn a profit or to 
gain some sort of a reputational boost. We will not offer a thorough anal-
ysis of such a possibility here. Indeed, we recognize that opposition to 
notice-and-comment judicial decisionmaking would likely be based in 
part on its unfamiliarity and the inevitable uncertainties about the conse-
quences of new mechanisms, and those concerns would be much greater 
with a sufficiently advanced online filtering mechanism of this sort.  
3. Simple mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine simple, low-tech filtering me-
chanisms that could be incorporated into a rollout of even a simple 
version of a notice-and-comment system. One such mechanism would 
be to allow each party, as well as each amicus, to submit a brief com-
ment strictly limited in length, perhaps even to just a couple of pages, 
  
 321 See generally Michael Abramowicz, Predictocracy (Yale 2008) (providing an overview of 
the use of prediction markets by decisionmaking institutions).  
 322 See id at 41–46. 
 323 See id at 28–32. 
 324 Conditional prediction markets can be used to estimate the probability of one event 
only if some other condition is met. See id at 144–54, 199–204. 
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at the end of the public comment period. This comment might include 
its own analysis, or it might emphasize points from other comments 
submitted by the public that the party believes to be particularly help-
ful. This simple approach would force an interested party to hone in 
on the most important weaknesses of the judicial opinion. With this 
approach, the comment period would not simply amount to another 
round of briefing, though a party that wanted to might submit leng-
thier comments during the general public comment phase.  
This approach would highlight a set of brief comments to which a 
court would be expected to give particular attention. There would also be 
some incentive for parties to read through the public comments in an 
effort to identify any important arguments that they might have missed. 
This is not a perfect system—sometimes, it might not be in any party’s 
private interest to pass along a useful comment by a member of the pub-
lic
325
—but it at least achieves a crude version of the filtering function.  
An alternative (or perhaps additional) option might be for courts 
to require that parties or members of the public seeking to comment 
must do so through an attorney, who is required (subject to sanction 
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or its equiva-
lent) to sign a statement indicating that the comment is germane, im-
portant, supported by the law
326
 or the record, and is not duplicative of 
other comments already submitted. These requirements would reduce 
irrelevant, inflammatory, and duplicative comments, though admitted-
ly the definition of duplicative would have to be sensibly spelled out 
and enforced. Combined with sensible length-limits, they would keep 
the court’s workload reasonable. They would also provide some incen-
tive for those who hope to receive credit for their comments to submit 
relatively early, lest work on the comments be wasted once someone 
else makes the same point. That, in turn, would encourage other 
would-be commenters not to waste time once others have already 
made the point that they were going to make. 
CONCLUSION 
Notice-and-comment judicial decisionmaking, we have argued, 
could help judges obtain information from both parties and nonpar-
ties, improve the legitimacy of judicial proceedings, and help constrain 
judges to follow the rule of law. As long as we do not also import hard 
look review into the judicial arena, the costs of the process may be 
surprisingly small, and a shift of some resources to this new final stage 
  
 325 See note 85 and accompanying text. 
 326 Or is warranted by “a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 
existing law or for establishing new law.” FRCP 11(b)(2). 
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of the judicial process would likely improve decisionmaking. We en-
courage courts and legislatures to consider formally implementing a 
simple version of this procedure. In the long term, further refinements, 
such as a system for reviewing randomly selected opinions or a sophis-
ticated filtering mechanism that highlights especially strong com-
ments, could be explored. In the short term, we would encourage indi-
vidual judges to experiment with opening tentative opinions to public 
comment, even if that is not likely to be as effective as a more institu-
tionalized approach. In sum, we see little downside to experimentation 
and expect that such experimentation would show that even a simple 
system of notice and comment could produce significant benefits. 
We recognize, though, that there may be considerable resistance 
to our proposal. Skeptics might worry that notice and comment would 
open the “black box” of judicial decisionmaking, exposing as fraught 
with uncertainty a process that, for reasons of judicial dignity and legi-
timacy, is best shielded from public view.
327
 That concern might have 
some validity if notice and comment exposed a court’s inner delibera-
tions, but a released tentative opinion would reflect the outcome of 
those deliberations, not their dynamics. The tentative opinion would tell 
us nothing about how the court reached its decision; it would only tell 
us what that tentative decision is. The process may be an invitation to a 
court to change its mind, but the judicial system already includes error-
correction features, including appellate review and overruling of previous 
precedents. If the goal is to fool the public into thinking that courts al-
ways get things right the first time, the cat is already out of the bag. 
A related, but more fundamental, concern is that the propriety of 
judicial lawmaking remains a subject of considerable dispute,
328
 and we 
suspect that our proposal might be seen to take sides in the debate, 
and to do so in a way that calls unseemly attention to the controversial 
resemblance between the modern judiciary and the explicitly regula-
tory arms of government. But our proposal need not be taken to em-
brace judicial lawmaking. Notice and comment makes sense even if 
one believes, as is often the case, that legal authorities do dictate a 
“correct” answer, and that judges should do nothing more than apply 
the law to particular disputes. If a judge’s job is simply to call balls and 
strikes,
329
 then notice and comment provides slow-motion instant rep-
  
 327 See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 Yale L J 1311, 1341 (1999) (discussing 
the view “that judicial deliberation requires extraordinary protection from the harms of publicity”). 
 328 See, for example, Hartnett, 74 NYU L Rev at 126 (cited in note 42) (“Courts (or at least 
federal courts) do not sit to pronounce the law, but rather to decide cases and controversies.”). 
 329 At his confirmation hearing to become Chief Justice, John Roberts said, “I will remem-
ber that it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.” Confirmation Hearing for 
John Roberts to the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Senate Committee of the 
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lay. That is to say, the comments submitted to courts will often be of a 
very different nature from the comments submitted to administrative 
agencies. In the judicial context, the value of notice and comment does 
not lie only in its ability to inform decisionmakers of the policy impli-
cations of their proposed rulings. It lies also in its ability to inform 
judges of relevant cases, regulations, statutes, facts in the record, and 
the like, so as to help ensure that judges decide cases in accordance 
with the governing legal authorities—to help ensure, that is, that 
judges properly follow (rather than make) the law.  
In any event, even those who rail against so-called “judicial activ-
ism” now generally accept that judges sometimes make law.
330
 That 
reality can be celebrated, or it can be lamented. (Again, we take no 
position here.) But it cannot be denied. Much of the most influential 
legal scholarship in recent decades has concerned itself with develop-
ing a judicial philosophy that seeks to protect against the downsides to 
judicial lawmaking identified in this Article. Cass Sunstein’s “minimal-
ism,” for example, strives to mitigate the costs of judicial mistakes and 
misinformation, and to constrain ideological decisionmaking, by ask-
ing courts to decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.
331
 But 
those efforts, whatever their merits, depend on the good faith and self-
restraint of individual judges to carry them out in each case.
332
 Our 
proposal is institutional—seeking a systemic modification of the judi-
cial process to make it more amenable to the judicial project. The de-
cisionmaking process of our adversarial legal system arose in a bygone 
era when courts were understood only to resolve disputes by applica-
tion of preexisting, discoverable law, not to announce rules of law.
333
 In 
many ways, the venerable old judicial process is not well suited to the 
modern judicial task. We believe that it is time to consider modifying 
that process to incorporate from the world of administrative law a 
procedure that was sensibly crafted for precisely the rulemaking task 
that the judiciary is now generally understood to perform.  
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 330 See, for example, James B. Beam Distilling Co v Georgia, 501 US 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia 
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in a real sense ‘make’ law.”).  
 331 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 4, 7 (1996). 
 332 Our proposal could be seen to complement a theory like Sunstein’s, insofar as the com-
ment period could be used to inform judges of instances in which they are poised to decide more 
than is necessary to the resolution of the dispute.  
 333 Consider Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev at 883 (cited in note 75) (“The common law’s me-
thods and theory were developed at a time when most common law judges understood them-
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